# 1NC

### 1

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics—displaces voluntary efforts

**Younkins 2k** (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm, JMP)

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion.

If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should:

before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it;

ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...;

recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and

begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes.

Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

### 2

#### They engage with a *grave* and *persistent* human rights violator - Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?

We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.

Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.

An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?

First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)

Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."

Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing.

We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 3

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Hydrocarbons are key – China’s on the hunt

**Fergusson 12** (Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

China’s thirst for resources

With the fastest growing large economy in the world, China’s hunger for resources is extraordinary, its “oil demand increased by more than 55 percent between 2000 and 2006.”[15] Despite possessing great oil reserves of its own, for the first time ever, China “became a net importer of oil in 1993 – and its energy demands are expected to continue increasing at an annual rate of 4–5 percent through at least 2015, compared to an annual rate of about 1 percent in industrialized countries.”[16] Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington Cynthia Watson notes that “China has a targeted need to find energy resources,” [17] because the subsequent shortfall in demand versus consumption has to be made up by the acquisition of resources from external sources. For the most part, much of this shortfall has been made up by importing from Russia, and importing from OPEC allies such as Oman.

However, as in any business, diversification is key to protect yourself from the turbulence of the open market and “volatility in the Middle East combined with growing uncertainty in oil-rich neighbouring countries such as Russia have led China to seek investment opportunities in other regions, particularly Africa and Latin America.” [18] While it would be a caricature to describe China as insular, particularly since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, it would be fair to summarise that its forays into Africa and the Americas represent its first real extra-regional political excursions. As its thirst for resources is not going to be quenched in the near future, “China can be expected to continue its determined quest for hydrocarbons and … will be venturing into the United States’ traditional zones of influence.” [19] This is the crucial point of discussion from the point of viewpoint of this essay. While China has made many more seemingly significant steps in its relationship with Africa, for the most part, the countries with whom it deals are not U.S allies. The table below shows where China imports its oil from.

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 4

#### Debt will pass, but the plan destroys Obama’s finite leverage with House Republicans

Easley, 9/18 (Jason, 9/18/2013, “Obama’s Genius Labeling of GOP Demands Extortion Has Already Won The Debt Ceiling Fight,” <http://www.politicususa.com/2013/09/18/obamas-genius-labeling-gop-demands-extortion-won-debt-ceiling-fight.html)>)

Obama use of the term extortion to describe the House Republican debt ceiling demands was a step forward in a strategy that has already made it a near certainty that he will win this standoff.

President Obama effectively ended any Republican hopes of getting a political victory on the debt ceiling when he called their demands extortion. Nobody likes being extorted. The American people don’t like feeling like they are being shaken down. The White House knows this, which is why they are using such strong language to criticize the Republicans. Obama is doing the same thing to House Republicans that he has been doing to the entire party for the last few years. The president is defining them before they can define themselves.

Obama is taking the same tactics that he used to define Mitt Romney in the summer of 2012 and applying them to John Boehner and his House Republicans. While Republicans are fighting among themselves and gearing up for another pointless run at defunding Obamacare, the president is already winning the political battle over the debt ceiling. His comments today were a masterstroke of strategy that will pay political dividends now and in the future. If the president is successful anytime a Republican talks about defunding Obamacare, the American people will think extortion. Republicans keep insisting on unconstitutional plots to kill Obamacare, and the president is calling them out on it.

Republicans haven’t realized it yet, but while they are chasing the fool’s gold of defunding Obamacare they have already lost on the debt ceiling. By caving to the lunatic fringe in his party, John Boehner may have handed control of the House of Representatives back to Democrats on a silver platter.

While Republicans posture on Obamacare, Obama is routing them on the debt ceiling.

#### Plan causes controversy and backlash – executive agreements and riders

Lugar et. al. 12 (Richard J., former US Senator, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, One Hundred and Twelfth Congress, Second Session, December 21, 2012, “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT,” <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>, alp)

An executive agreement would not require the two-thirds vote necessitated by a treaty, but instead it would be approved in the same form as a statute, requiring passage by majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Legislation approving the agreement, necessary implementing authorities, and clarifications regarding certain provisions of the TBA could be subject to amendment, including by items unrelated to the TBA itself, thus possibly miring the TBA in other political fights.

#### Failure to resolve debt ensures nuclear war and turns all impacts

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard.

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 5

#### The United States federal government should pass the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement excluding Article 20’s disclosure clause.

#### **It solves without oil lobby backlash and ensures GOP support**

Geman 4/25 (Ben, The Hill, April 25, 2013, “House GOP moves to shield oil companies from disclosure rule,” [http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rules](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rulesm), alp)

A House GOP bill to implement a U.S.-Mexico offshore energy accord exempts oil companies operating under the pact from controversial federal rules that force energy producers to disclose their payments to foreign governments. The provision could become a sticking point in enacting the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement, a 2012 accord to enable cooperation in development of oil-and-gas along a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. “I don’t see how that provision can be taken out,” said Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.), the chairman of a House subcommittee that reviewed the bill Thursday. The U.S.-Mexico energy accord has strong support from Republicans and the Obama administration. Backers note it will open a substantial offshore region to oil production and enable new cooperation between U.S. companies and PEMEX, Mexico’s state-owned oil giant. But Interior and State Department officials declined, at Thursday's hearing, to weigh in on the GOP implementing bill’s limited exemption from Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure rules. The legislation appears to be the first bill introduced to alter the resource payments disclosure provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law, a provision that faces heavy opposition from oil industry and business groups. Dodd-Frank requires SEC-listed oil, natural gas and mining companies to disclose payments to foreign governments related to projects in their countries, such as money for production licenses, royalties and so forth. On Thursday, Republicans and officials with oil industry groups said the exemption in the GOP bill is needed to prevent a collision with confidentiality provisions in the U.S.-Mexico accord. “The treaty that we are hammering out with Mexico does address confidentiality and allows for it for competitive reasons for both their company and American companies, so that right there puts that agreement at odds with Dodd-Frank,” Lamborn, chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, told reporters.

#### Disclosure harms industry competitiveness

Geman 4/25 (Ben, The Hill, April 25, 2013, “House GOP moves to shield oil companies from disclosure rule,” [http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rules](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rulesm), alp)

But oil industry and business groups challenging the SEC rule in court say it will impose costly burdens and hinder competitiveness, especially by placing SEC-listed oil companies at a disadvantage when competing for contracts overseas against state-owned Russian and Chinese firms. The industry unsuccessfully appealed to the SEC to include various exemptions in the rule, including an exemption when or if foreign government bars the disclosure. As the administration weighs its position on the Dodd-Frank exemption in the House U.S.-Mexico bill, the topic looms as a potential stumbling block to enacting an energy accord that has support from the oil industry, Republicans and the Obama administration. “We believe the [transboundary] agreement would help facilitate the safe and responsible management of offshore petroleum reservoirs that straddle our maritime boundary and strengthen overall our bilateral relations,” said Carlos Pascual, the State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs, who told the House committee that the administration wants “swift passage” of implementing legislation. The U.S.-Mexico agreement will make nearly 1.5 million acres available for leasing, U.S. officials say. It will also make the wider transboundary region more attractive to U.S. energy companies by removing legal uncertainties, Interior and State Department officials say.

#### That causes industry offshoring

Rapoza 11 (Kenneth Rapoza, 3/23/11, Forbes, “Why U.S. Oil Rigs Left Gulf of Mexico for Brazil”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/03/23/as-us-oil-rigs-leave-for-brazil-permits-and-prices-only-factor/ HSA)

But Diamond and their peers also moved recently for another reason — money. Diamond said that, in their case, they were getting better deals to drill elsewhere. They have around 20 rigs and jack-ups, some rented to Petrobras, some rented to the US multinationals, floating around in Brazil at this time. “Oil companies are going to drill wherever it is profitable to drill,” said Joe Petrowski, CEO of Gulf Oil, a large gasoline distributor in the US. “The reason we are not drilling more for shale oil in the Bakken formation in North Dakota – and production there has indeed increased, by the way — is because if it costs $40 to produce a barrel of oil there compared to $20 in Nigeria, we are going to go to Nigeria.”

#### That’s key to the economy

Pipeline and Gas Journal 12 (Pipeline and Gas Journal, internally citing CERA, the Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Dr. Daniel Yergin, Pulitzer Prize winning author of *The Quest: Energy Security and the Remaking of the Modern World*, BA from Yale University, PhD in international relations from Cambridge University, Cambridge Marshall Scholar, honorary doctoral degrees from the Colorado School of Mines, the University of Houston, and the University of Missouri, and Roberto Bocca, senior director and head of Energy Industries at the World Economic Forum, degrees in business and economics from the University of Turin, Special for the Pipeline and Gas Journal, Vol. 239, No. 5, May 2012, “ENERGY INDUSTRY HAS POTENTIAL AS KEY ECONOMIC ENGINE,” <http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/energy-industry-has-potential-key-economic-engine>, alp)

Having proved resilient throughout the Great Recession compared to other sectors, the energy industry has the potential to be a key engine of economic growth and recovery, according to a new study by IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates (IHS CERA) and the World Economic Forum. The findings of the study were presented at CERAWeek 2012 in Houston. The report, Energy Vision 2012: Energy for Economic Growth provides a framework for understanding the larger economic role of the energy industry at a time when issues of employment and investment are so critical in a troubled global economy. The report examines the industry’s role as a driver of investment and job creation as well as energy’s importance as the key input for most goods and services in the economy. “The energy industry is unique in its economic importance,” IHS CERA Chairman Daniel Yergin said. “The energy sector has the potential to be a tremendous economic catalyst and source of innovation in its own right, while it simultaneously produces the very lifeblood that drives the broader economy.” The energy industry—by nature capital intensive and requiring high levels of investment—has the ability to generate outsize contributions to gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the study says. In the United States, the oil and gas extraction sector grew at a rate of 4.5% in 2011 compared to an overall GDP growth rate of 1.7%. The highly skilled technical nature of energy industry jobs is reflected in compensation levels. As a result, employees of the energy industry contribute more absolute spending per capita to the economy than the average worker and contribute a larger share of GDP per worker than most industries. The energy industry’s most important immediate source of economic potential is its high “employment multiplier effect” that is a result of its extensive supply chain and relatively high worker pay. Every direct job created in the oil, natural gas and related industries in the U.S. generates three or more indirect and induced jobs across the economy, the study says. This places oil and gas ahead of the U.S. financial, telecommunications, software and non-residential construction sectors in terms of the additional employment associated with each direct worker. “We always suspected energy had a vital role to play in the economic recovery,” said Roberto Bocca, Senior Director, Head of Energy Industries, World Economic Forum. “But we were still surprised when the data uncovered the magnitude of the sector’s multiplier effects.”

#### Extinction

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, **moving toward a world free of** nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 1NC – Environment

**No brink—hundreds of species have gone extinct by now and they don’t stop all species loss**

**Species loss alt causes**

**EDF 7** (Environmental Defense Fund, The Importance of Wildlife and the Diversity of Life, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=445, AG)

The major cause of species loss in the U.S. and worldwide is the loss and degradation of habitat. As forests, wetlands, prairies, coastal estuaries and other habitats are converted to residential, commercial or agricultural use and other types of development, wild plants and animals vanish. In addition, many areas known as "hotspots" for their unusually rich biodiversity, such as Florida and Southern California, also have rapidly expanding human populations, which accelerates the loss of biodiversity. In the U.S. non-native species are the second largest cause of species loss. Hundreds of Hawaii's unique wildlife and plants are being driven to extinction by non-native plants and animals. Other factors are pollution, disease, over-fishing and over-hunting.

**No extinction**

**Easterbrook** **3—**senior fellow at the New Republic(“We're All Gonna Die!”, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

**Environment resilient—adaptation checks**

**Doremus 2k** – Law Professor, California (Holly, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, AG)

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 [\*47] One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

#### Aff can’t solve safety – too broad and inconclusive

McLaughlin 12 (Richard J., professor at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies at Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi, endowed chair of Marine Policy and Law, lecturer at various academic institutions including Cambridge University, the University of California – Berkeley, the University of Hawaii, the University of Miami, the University of Oregon, former professor of law and Louise Stewart Lecturer at the University of Mississippi School of Law, former director of the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program, JD from Tulane University and JSD doctorate in law from UC – Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School of Law, LLM masters in marine law and policy from the University of Washington School of Law, LOSI conference papers 2012, May 21-24, 2012, “Understanding the Recent U.S. and Mexico Treaty on Shared Hydrocarbons: Moving Toward Transboundary Marine Energy Security in the Gulf of Mexico,” <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/McLaughlin-final.pdf>, alp)

Article 10 of the Agreement contains rather broad language concerning safety and environmental protection. It is somewhat insufficient as it does not establish any specific environmental or safety regulations and instead provides general language about adopting common standards and requirements whose adequacy and compatibility is yet to be seen.40 As is recurrent in this agreement, it leaves the development of specific procedures for the implementation of this article for later.41

#### The plan kills the environment – risk of spills and drilling pollution – solvency is just rhetoric

**Greenpeace 12** (an international organization that works for environmental conservation and the preservation of endangered species, February 22, 2012, “Transboundary agreement spells disaster for the Gulf,” http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/media-center/news-releases/Transboundary-agreement-spells-disaster-for-the-Gulf/)//DR. H

In response to the United States and Mexico signing an agreement to develop oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico Greenpeace United States and Mexico have signed their own transboundary agreement.

Greenpeace US and Mexico signed the agreement concerning their governments continued obsession with helping the gas and oil industry profit off polluting the climate and devastating the Gulf of Mexico. “The US and Mexican governments say their agreement is “designed to enhance energy security in North America,” an impossibility given the continued support for fossil fuel production over secure, renewable energy sources. President Obama's failure to permanently reject the Keystone XL pipeline, his expanding coal mining on public lands, and approval of oil exploration in the Arctic lay the groundwork for this new policy,” said Greenpeace US Climate Campaigner Kyle Ash.

“This agreement opens new areas to dangerous, expensive, and controversial offshore drilling techniques. This is what led to the deaths of eleven workers and over 200 million gallons of oil spewing into the Gulf just two years ago,’ said Mr Ash. “The US-Mexican joint statement called for “the highest degree of safety and environmental standards,” which the US Congress has failed to improve since the Deepwater disaster. A recent report from the National Research Council reaffirmed that deepwater drilling remains unsafe.”

Drilling could take place in the Gulf at depths typically greater than 8,500 feet, deeper than at any drilling site in the world. The BP Deepwater Horizon catastrophe occurred in water 5,000 feet deep

“Deepwater exploration is a huge risk to the environment and a waste of resources for the country. Each oil spill at sea disrupts the ecosystem, causing ecological disturbances, some temporary, others permanent. State-owned oil company Pemex has a history of oil spills off the coast of Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Tabasco and Campeche and now with plans for deepwater exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, the potential for disaster increases exponentially,” said Greenpeace Mexico Climate Campaigner Beatriz Olivera.

“To bet on difficult and expensive oil extraction is a waste of public resources for Mexico’s goverment. The border area is classified as a high risk area for deep levels. Drilling a single well in the border region means additional indebtedness of over $ 150 million (1) for Pemex” said Ms Olivera.

“This joint declaration by the governments of President Obama and President Calderon is part of an historic trend of North American governments doing the bidding of the oil industry. Greenpeace Mexico and Greenpeace United States will do everything they can to change their governments' policies that destroy the climate and keep North America energy insecure,” said Mr Ash.

Status quo solves Clean tech – Obama

Silverstein 7-8-10 (Ken, Obama’s Climate Program Focuses on Expanding and Sharing Clean Tech, Jul 08, 2013, http://www.energybiz.com/article/13/07/obama-s-climate-program-focuses-expanding-and-sharing-clean-tech)

For its part, the Obama administration remains committed to green energies, saying that they fit within its overall economic and environmental program. With that, his climate agenda calls on the issuance of permits to build 10,000 megawatts of renewables on publicly-owned lands by the end of this year. He wants another 10,000 megawatts by 2020. The president’s hope is to shift the mindset of the American people, creating public support for federal and state programs to advance clean technologies. If those tools could be commercialized, they could replace the applied science that is prevalent in the U.S. today. Developing nations, meantime, could get access to cleaner power generation that would help fuel their expanding economies.

**Warming inevitable**

**Dickinson 9** (Pete, Global warming: Is it too late?, 26 August 2009, http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article19.php?id=1142, AMiles)

Note – paper cited is by Susan Solomon - atmospheric chemist working for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - Gian-Kasper Plattnerb- Group, Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, UCLA - Reto Knuttic - Institute for Atmopsheric and Climate Science, PhD

New research is claiming that concentrations of carbon dioxide (the main greenhouse gas, CO2) will remain high for at least 1,000 years, even if greenhouse gases are eliminated in the next few decades. The climate scientists who produced this work assert that the effects of global warming, such as high sea levels and reduced rainfall in certain areas, will also persist over this time scale. (The findings are in a paper published in February in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by researchers from the USA, Switzerland and France, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0812721106 ) Most previous estimates of the longevity of global warming effects, after greenhouse gases were removed, have ranged from a few decades to a century, so this new analysis could represent a development with very serious implications, including political ones. For example, those campaigning for action on climate change could be disheartened and climate sceptics could opportunistically say that nothing should be done because it is now too late. The authors of the paper make various estimates of CO2 concentrations based on the year emissions are cut, assumed to be from 2015 to 2050. They make optimistic assumptions, for instance, that emissions are cut at a stroke rather than gradually, and that their annual rate of growth before cut-off is 2%, not the 3% plus witnessed from 2000-05. They then estimate what the effects would be on surface warming, sea level rise and rainfall over a 1,000-year period using the latest climate models. The results of the melting of the polar ice caps are not included in the calculations of sea levels, only the expansion of the water in the oceans caused by the surface temperature increase so, as the authors point out, the actual new sea level will be much higher. The best-case results for surface warming, where action is taken in 2015 to eliminate emissions, show that over 1,000 years the temperature rises from 1.3 to 1.0 degree centigrade above pre-industrial levels. The worst case, where action is delayed to 2050, predicts surface temperatures will increase from just under to just over four degrees by 2320 and then remain approximately constant for the rest of the millennium. High levels of CO2 persist in the atmosphere because, over long timescales, reduction of the gas is dependent on the ability of the oceans to absorb it, but there are limits to this due to the physics and chemistry of deep-ocean mixing. On the other hand, the amount of heat in the atmosphere that can be absorbed by the sea, the key way surface temperatures are decreased, is limited by the same scientific laws. As a result, carbon concentrations cannot fall enough to force temperatures down while there is simultaneously reduced cooling due to limited heat loss to the oceans.

**No impact to warming**

**Lomborg 8**—Director - Copenhagen Consensus Center Adjunct prof, Copenhagen Business School. (Björn, Warming warnings get overheated, 15 August 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange, AMiles)

Much of the global warming debate is perhaps best described as a constant outbidding by frantic campaigners, producing a barrage of ever-more scary scenarios in an attempt to get the public to accept their civilisation-changing proposals. Unfortunately, the general public – while concerned about the environment – is distinctly unwilling to support questionable solutions with costs running into tens of trillions of pounds. Predictably, this makes the campaigners reach for even more outlandish scares. These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

**1ac claravas evidence says clean tech solves oil dependence - Oil dependence is key to US-Saudi relations**

Mouawad9 New York Times, “Saudi Blasts American Energy Policy”, <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/saudi-blasts-american-energy-policy/>

The question of American “energy independence” clearly rankles officials in Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest exporter of crude oil, who seem increasingly puzzled by the energy policy of the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer. In a short and strongly-worded essay in Foreign Policy magazine, Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to the United States and a nephew to King Abdullah, said that for American politicians, invoking energy independence “is now as essential as baby-kissing,” and accuses them of “demagoguery.” All the talk about energy independence, Mr. al-Faisal said, is “political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and consuming countries alike.” There is no technology on the horizon that can completely replace oil as the fuel for the United States’ massive manufacturing, transportation, and military needs; any future, no matter how wishful, will include a mix of renewable and nonrenewable fuels. Considering this, efforts spent proselytizing about energy independence should instead focus on acknowledging energy interdependence. Like it or not, the fates of the United States and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia date back to the 1930s when American geologists first struck oil in the kingdom. While American companies built the Saudi oil industry, Americans have never shaken off their suspicions and mistrust of the kingdom since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. It’s not the first time a Saudi official has criticized American energy policy, or its growing reliance on renewable fuels. Many of Prince Turki’s arguments recycle Saudi Arabia’s position that for the past 30 years, the oil-rich kingdom has acted in a responsible manner to keep oil markets well supplied. Prince Turki correctly points at the steps taken by Saudi Arabia in recent years to increase its production to make up for lost production in Iraq or elsewhere in times of crisis, and invest close to $100 billion in new capacity over the past five years. On the other hand, he points out that four countries — Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela — failed to live up to expectations that they would raise their production over the past decade for a variety of reasons, including “a U.S. invasion” in the case of Iraq. The Saudis have genuine reasons to fear the effects of the Obama administration’s energy policy and its commitment to reducing oil consumption, as well as efforts to reduce carbon emissions. As Prince Turki points out himself, Saudi Arabia holds 25 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and would like to keep selling oil for several more decades. As such, the Saudis know that any attempt to reduce gasoline consumption is a threat to the future of the Saudi economy. It’s an old refrain: in his most famous remark, the former Saudi oil minister, Sheik Yamani, once said that the stone age didn’t end because the world ran out of stones, and the oil age will not end because the world runs out of oil. It will end when something replaces it. The trend has already started. Oil demand in the United States has peaked — instead of rising as it has since the dawn of the age of oil more than a century ago, the nation’s oil consumption has begun its long decline. The question is: how fast will the transition take?

Relations are key to stabilizing Iran and Pakistan

Levine 11 – adjunct professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, where he teaches energy and security in the Security Studies Program, contributing editor at Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb, Steve, Foreign Policy, “Frenemies forever”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/opening\_gambit\_frenemies\_forever?page=0,0, WEA)

Besides, Saudi Arabia isn't just a giant gas station with a flag. Saudi help is now essential for numerous top-shelf U.S. priorities, from containing Iran to countering terrorism to extricating U.S. troops from Afghanistan and keeping Pakistan stable. **Only Saudi Arabia**, with its carefully cultivated, behind-the-scenes links to countries and leaders who do not trust Washington, can play this role.

That goes nuclear – turns case

Morgan 10 **–**Labour Party Executive Committee, political writer, author of "The Mind of a Terrorist Fundamentalist - the Cult of Al Qaeda" (Stephen, “Better Another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR,” 6/4, http://society.ezinemark.com/better-another-taliban-afghanistan-than-a-taliban-nuclear-pakistan-4d0ce18ba75.html)

The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

### 1NC – Wetlands

**--Minimal and local impact to soil erosion**

**Ruttan ’99** [Vernon, Prof. Emeritus Econ. And Applied Econ. @ U. Minnesota, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, “The transition to agricultural sustainability”, 96:5960-5967, May, http://www.pnas.org/content/96/11/5960.full.pdf?ck=nck, CMR]

The fact that the data is so limited should not be taken to suggest that soil erosion is not a serious problem. But it should induce some caution in accepting some of the more dramatic pronouncements about the inability of to sustain agricultural production (32). The impact of human-induced soil degradation and loss is not evenly distributed across agroclimatic regions, either in developed or developing countries. What I do feel comfortable in concluding is that the impacts on the resource base and on regional economies from soil erosion and degradation are local rather than global. It is unlikely that soil degradation and erosion will emerge as important threats to the world food supply in the foreseeable future. Where soil erosion does represent a significant threat to the resource and the economic base of an area, the gains from implementation of the technical and institutional changes necessary to reclaim degraded soil resources, or at least to prevent further degradation, can be quite substantial.

#### Wetlands are resilient—

(Ruman 09 , Christina Ripken, Master of Science degree in "Agricultural Science and Resource Management in the Tropics and Subtropics “Resilience and Vulnerability of Wetlands”, May 2009, Institute of Crop Science and Resource Conservation, Department of Plant Nutrition, http://www.pitros.uni-bonn.de/downloads/ripken-thesis-2009.pdf)

Humans are a part of, and not apart from, the system and will, to a great extent,¶ determine their own paths through management of the ecosystem. They are¶ capable of moving the thresholds away from or closer to the current state of the¶ system and of making the thresholds more difficult or easier to reach by altering¶ resistance. Through these management options, humans are capable of restoring¶ (adding resilience] to ecosystems or to provoke the contrary (Folke et al., 2004].¶ Ecosystems are complex, adaptive systems that are characterized by historical¶ dependency, nonlinear dynamics, threshold effects, multiple basins of attraction,¶ and limited predictability (Levin, 1999]. Wetlands, in their natural state, because of their semi aquatic nature, are relatively resilient to state shifts. The seasonal¶ changes in the hydrological regime result in changing soil factors which provide a¶ wide natural range scale for the state variables. Many disturbances can be endured before the tolerance levels are reached and the ecosystem state shifts. Wetlands¶ ecological resilience is related to slowly changing variables such as soil or substrate nutrient levels, pH levels, redox potential, and longer-term climatic factors. This¶ resilience is tested by recurring disturbances in the form of drought/flood cycles,¶ sedimentation, and grazing, among others. The erosion of resilience is a result of¶ human intervention, by modulating distinctive ecosystem processes, e.g. the mitigation of floods and droughts or fires (Gunderson and Pritchard, 2002) or¶ changes in the trophic level or nutrient enrichment (Gunderson, 2001; Scheffer et¶ al., 2001; Beisner et al., 2003; Carpenter, 2003).

#### No terminal impact uniqueness

Skaggs 7/9 (Christina, “US Coast Guard confirms natural gas leak in Gulf of Mexico”, July 9th, 2013, http://www.wlox.com/story/22797968/us-coast-guard-confirms-natural-gas-leak-in-gulf-of-mexico)

The U.S. Coast Guard confirmed a natural gas leak in the Gulf of Mexico has forced the evacuation of a gas production platform 74 miles southwest of Port Fourchon, LA. According to the Coast Guard, the leak began Sunday at Ship Shoal Block 225 platform B, which is a natural gas and crude oil platform owned by Energy Resources Technology (ERT). The Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) are responding to what the Coast Guard calls "the loss of well control". Once ERT learned of the leak, the company began work to temporarily plug the well and contacted the Coast Guard and BSEE, according to Coast Guard officials. The Coast Guard and BSEE inspectors conducted overflights early Tuesday. Coast Guard officials said rainbow sheen runs more than four miles wide by three quarters of a mile long. Coast Guard and BSEE will conduct an investigation of the incident to determine the cause of the loss of well control.

### 1NC – Mexican econ

**No extinction from bioweapons**

**O’Neill 4** O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

**No impact to heg**

**Threat exaggeration**

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At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president—who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests—the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, **overestimate** the intensity and immediacy of **threats**, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with.

**Over-stretch and free riding**

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To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is **beyond the pale** even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008— the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The **only way** to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically **decreases its share**. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest.

**Anti-Americanism**

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As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen—and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy.

**Multipolarity solves**

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A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### Alt causes to effective PEMEX – bureaucracy, funding, nationalism, tax revenues, refining, and unions

The Economist 8/10 (The Economist, August 10, 2013, “Unfixable Pemex,” <http://www.economist.com/news/business/21583253-even-if-government-plucks-up-courage-reform-it-pemex-will-be-hard-fix-unfixable>, alp)

Its first problem is structural: it has never been treated as a profit-making company. Astonishingly for a monopoly that drills every barrel of oil in Mexico at an average cost of less than $7, and sells it for around $100, it lost an accumulated 360 billion pesos, or $29 billion, in the five years to 2012 (despite a small profit last year). This is partly because although its oil-and-gas-production side makes a fat profit, its refining business loses a fortune, and its petrochemicals division is also loss-making. Worse, the government sucks out cash to compensate for the lack of tax revenues it collects in the rest of the economy. Last year 55% of Pemex’s revenues went in royalties and taxes. This perpetual drain on its cashflow means its debt has soared to $60 billion. The hole in its pension reserve is a whopping $100 billion. Besides siphoning off its profits, the government refuses to let it make its own decisions. Its boss is appointed by the president, the energy minister chairs its board of directors, and the finance ministry vets its budget, line by line. The board has no independent directors and lacks business expertise, says a former chief executive. He notes, for example, that more than 20 years ago the board began “benchmarking” Pemex’s refineries against international peers, but they have remained at the bottom of the league even as parts of Mexico’s manufacturing industry have become models of efficiency. With 151,000 employees, Pemex’s output of oil per worker is well short of that of its foreign counterparts (see chart). Its union is bloated and pampered. Reforma, a Mexican newspaper, reported that the union’s leadership received $65,000 a day last year for business trips and general expenses. Mr Morales admits that the upstream business is overstaffed with workers who cannot be laid off, even though the wells they work on have dried up. Meanwhile, managers suffer a stifling internal bureaucracy. Mr Morales says he needs five sets of approvals for any big contract, including one from the full board. The management has made a string of poor investment decisions. Faced with the collapse of production at its crown jewel, Cantarell, it has poured unprecedented amounts into exploration and production—a combined $70 billion between 2008 and 2012. But since much of this has gone into areas for which Pemex is technically ill-prepared, such as deep-water drilling and onshore shale oil, the returns have been meagre. Mr Morales speaks proudly of the rise in production at other sites to offset Cantarell. But output and reserves have only barely stabilised, at levels well below their highs. Adrian Lajous, a former Pemex boss, says that, in contrast, the firm has underinvested in natural gas, resulting in Mexico having to import record volumes from America. In a tacit acknowledgment of this, Mr Morales says Pemex now plans to invest heavily in new gas production. The firm has also failed to find the $30 billion it is thought to need to reconfigure its refineries to produce petrol and diesel suitable for today’s cleaner cars. So Mexico will also suffer the national embarrassment of having to import more of these fuels. Whatever reforms the government announces, they will stop a long way short of privatising Pemex. It is so wrapped up in a myth of national sovereignty that even the energy minister, a champion of reform, insists that not a “single screw” will be sold. Reformists hope the government will at least let private firms work with Pemex to develop shale, deep-water and other challenging fields. But even this would require constitutional changes, and would face much resistance. Since Mexico has no significant private-sector oil industry, much of the investment would have to come from foreign firms, and for nationalists this would be hard to stomach.

#### No production decline

Campbell 12 **–** Robert Campbell, 5-22-2012; Reuters Market Analyst, Mexico is no longer an oil basketcase: Campbell http://www.petroleumworld.com/storyt12052302.htm

The following may be taken as heresy by oil perma-bulls but let's get it out in the open: it's time to scrap, or at the very least rigorously question, the assumption that Mexican oil production will dramatically fall sometime this decade. A predicted sharp fall in Mexican oil output has long underpinned part of one of the bullish theses behind strong oil prices: non-OPEC crude oil output is weak and getting weaker. Of course, Mexico is not the only part of the non-OPEC supply picture. But it is a big player. The country remains one of the world's biggest oil producers and exporters. The decline of nearly 25 percent in Mexican crude oil production capacity between 2004 and 2008 was a watershed event for oil supplies. But the problem is that analysts still assume that similar declines must inevitably come in the future. A glance at market balances uniformly assume sharp declines in Mexican oil output over the next decade, projecting forward a rerun of the dramatic fall in production experienced by Mexico between 2006-08 onto the future. Consider the facts. Mexican crude oil production, while still a far cry from its peak, has been fairly stable, oscillating between 2.5 million and 2.6 million barrels per day since mid-2009. Total liquids production, which adds condensates and natural gas liquids to crude output, has edged down, to just over 2.9 million bpd, but is off only 40,000 bpd from 2010 levels. Yet forecasters still assume steep drops in Mexican output. For instance, the 2010 Annual Energy Outlook published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration forecast Mexican liquids production would be only 2.31 million bpd in 2012.The EIA's 2011 forecast revised these views, but still assumes a decline in Mexican liquids output. The reference case calls for 2012 production to fall to 2.7 million bpd, or 2.8 million bpd in the high oil price scenario. Yet looking forward in the 2011 EIA forecast, steep declines are still projected, with output falling below 2 million bpd by 2019. The 2012 forecast again revises its view of Mexican output higher, in some cases sharply, but the medium-term forecast still calls for steep declines. The EIA is not alone. Similar forecasts have been made (and revised) in recent years by the International Energy Agency and private oil market analysts. OUT OF INTENSIVE CARE At least for now, the narrative on Mexico remains the same. Whatever state oil monopoly Pemex has done to keep production flat for the last three years is really just a pause in the inevitable decline. Of course this is not to say that all is well in Mexico's oil industry. Pemex remains grossly overstaffed, inefficient, bureaucratic and subject to political interference. Proven oil reserves continue to decline, albeit at a far slower pace than a few years ago.

#### High oil prices solve revenue

Market News International 11 5-9-2011; High Oil Prices Lift Pemex Profits, Challenges Remain http://imarketnews.com/node/30466

MEXICO CITY (MNI) - State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) is reaping huge earnings due to rising world oil prices, but analysts and company officials agree that steep challenges remain due to the government's tax take, meeting promised production increases, money losing subsidiaries and attracting companies via its new contract model. Mexico's basket of oil sold at $110.86 late last week, up from $80.60 at the end of last year, and $71.45 in early May 2010. But the increase was largely caused by factors which have little to do with Mexico. Investors are stampeding into commodities as low interest rates allow them to borrow in developed economies and park the money in appreciating goods. Meanwhile, the Pemex quarterly report released last week showed production, at 2.57 million barrels per day actually fell 1% compared with the first quarter of 2010, although average exports rose 10% to 1.37 million bpd. Still, with prices on the rise, the company posted net earnings of 4.2 billion in the first quarter, up from 1 billion during the same period a year earlier.

#### No solvency – can’t attract investment

Booth and Miroff 5/7(William, Nick, 5/7/13, “To power Mexico forward, Peña Nieto looks to energy reform,” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-07/world/39073749_1_energy-industry-foreign-oil-petroleos-de-mexico>, alp)

Lifting the restrictions on foreign oil companies through a constitutional amendment would require a two-thirds majority in Mexico’s Congress and the endorsement of more than half of the country’s state governors. Peña Nieto is expected to face considerable political wrangling from the powerful oil workers union, left-leaning lawmakers and interest groups, which are content with their slice of the status quo, even as overall production has slipped. Analysts say that unless Mexico can offer foreign drillers a share of the crude, rather than the fee-per-service contracts that Pemex offers, the country will have a hard time attracting the capital and expertise it needs. Because multinational oil companies raise money from investors based on the estimated amount of oil they own the rights to, and Mexico’s prevailing model affords them no ability to claim, or “book,” reserves, there’s little incentive to drill there. Then there is the problem of Pemex’s creaky infrastructure and poor safety record, underscored by a Jan. 31 explosion caused by a gas leak at the company’s Mexico City headquarters that killed 38 people and injured 120. Ownership concerns. Mexico’s three major political parties have signed a broadly written “Pact for Mexico,” whose ­energy-related provisions concur that all hydrocarbons should remain state-controlled and that Pemex needs to be a competitive, modern and profitable company with ramped-up production.

#### Oil not key – taxation proves – the plan undermines reform

Barnes 11 (Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow, faculty adviser to the Baker Institute Student Forum, former diplomat at the United States Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, graduate of Princeton University, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, April 29, 2011, “OIL AND U.S.–MEXICO BILATERAL RELATIONS,” <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>, alp)

In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.34 There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency. In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.35 Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States. To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive. It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome. Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.36 Nonetheless, the ability of the United States to encourage reform is severely limited. Mexican leaders are extremely sensitive to perceived “bullying” by the United States. Too public a U.S. position—particularly on opening up Mexican oil fields to foreign development—might actually undermine reform efforts. In any instance, the United States should be modest in its calls for reform in Mexico. After all, Mexico is not the only North American country with constitutional and cultural constraints on good public policy. As noted, the United States appears incapable of stopping the flow of weapons to Mexico. Recently queried on this, President Obama was reduced to spluttering about the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.37 Both Mexico and the United States should avoid fetishizing the oil sector. Petroleum production is a means, not an end—a reality often forgotten by resource nationalists and industry experts alike. In Mexico, petroleum production is only one sector of an economy that has failed to deliver broad-based, sustained growth. The importance of oil is, to a large degree, a manifestation of Mexico’s inability to develop an adequate taxation regime. We would not be discussing a potential crisis associated with declining production if the Mexican government were not so dependent on it for revenue.

#### No Mexican collapse – drug trade’s a stabilizer

Friedman 10 **–** American political scientist, founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of private intelligence corporation STRATFOR, political science professor at Dickinson College, briefed senior commanders in the armed services, Office of Net Assessments, SHAPE technical center, the US Army War College, National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation (George, “Mexico and the Failed State Revisited”, 4/6/10; [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100405\_mexico\_and\_failed\_state\_revisited>)//Beddow](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100405_mexico_and_failed_state_revisited%3e)//Beddow)

STRATFOR argued March 13, 2008, that Mexico was nearing the status of a failed state. A failed state is one in which the central government has lost control over significant areas of the country and the state is unable to function. In revisiting this issue, it seems to us that the Mexican government has lost control of the northern tier of Mexico to drug-smuggling organizations, which have significantly greater power in that region than government forces. Moreover, the ability of the central government to assert its will against these organizations has weakened to the point that decisions made by the state against the cartels are not being implemented or are being implemented in a way that would guarantee failure. Despite these facts, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Mexico is becoming a failed state. Instead, it appears the Mexican state has accommodated itself to the situation. Rather than failing, it has developed strategies designed both to ride out the storm and to maximize the benefits of that storm for Mexico. First, while the Mexican government has lost control over matters having to do with drugs and with the borderlands of the United States, Mexico City's control over other regions -- and over areas other than drug enforcement -- has not collapsed (though its lack of control over drugs could well extend to other areas eventually). Second, while drugs reshape Mexican institutions dramatically, they also, paradoxically, stabilize Mexico. We need to examine these crosscurrents to understand the status of Mexico. Mexico's Core Problem Let's begin by understanding the core problem. The United States consumes vast amounts of narcotics, which, while illegal there, make their way in abundance. Narcotics derive from low-cost agricultural products that become consumable with minimal processing. With its long, shared border with the United States, Mexico has become a major grower, processor and exporter of narcotics. Because the drugs are illegal and thus outside normal market processes, their price is determined by their illegality rather than by the cost of production. This means extraordinary profits can be made by moving narcotics from the Mexican side of the border to markets on the other side. Whoever controls the supply chain from the fields to the processing facilities and, above all, across the border, will make enormous amounts of money. Various Mexican organizations -- labeled cartels, although they do not truly function as such, since real cartels involve at least a degree of cooperation among producers, not open warfare -- vie for this business. These are competing businesses, each with its own competing supply chain. Typically, competition among businesses involves lowering prices and increasing quality. This would produce small, incremental shifts in profits on the whole while dramatically reducing prices. An increased market share would compensate for lower prices. Similarly, lawsuits are the normal solution to unfair competition. But neither is the case with regard to illegal goods. The surest way to increase smuggling profits is not through market mechanisms but by taking over competitors' supply chains. Given the profit margins involved, persons wanting to control drug supply chains would be irrational to buy, since the lower-cost solution would be to take control of these supply chains by force. Thus, each smuggling organization has an attached paramilitary organization designed to protect its own supply chain and to seize its competitors' supply chains. The result is ongoing warfare between competing organizations. Given the amount of money being made in delivering their product to American cities, these paramilitary organizations are well-armed, well-led and well-motivated. Membership in such paramilitary groups offers impoverished young men extraordinary opportunities for making money, far greater than would be available to them in legitimate activities. The raging war in Mexico derives logically from the existence of markets for narcotics in the United States; the low cost of the materials and processes required to produce these products; and the extraordinarily favorable economics of moving narcotics across the border. This warfare is concentrated on the Mexican side of the border. But from the Mexican point of view, this warfare does not fundamentally threaten Mexico's interests. A Struggle Far From the Mexican Heartland The heartland of Mexico is to the south, far from the country's northern tier. The north is largely a sparsely populated highland desert region seen from Mexico City as an alien borderland intertwined with the United States as much as it is part of Mexico. Accordingly, the war raging there doesn't represent a direct threat to the survival of the Mexican regime. (click here to enlarge image) Indeed, what the wars are being fought over in some ways benefits Mexico. The amount of money pouring into Mexico annually is stunning. It is estimated to be about $35 billion to $40 billion each year. The massive profit margins involved make these sums even more significant. Assume that the manufacturing sector produces revenues of $40 billion a year through exports. Assuming a generous 10 percent profit margin, actual profits would be $4 billion a year. In the case of narcotics, however, profit margins are conservatively estimated to stand at around 80 percent. The net from $40 billion would be $32 billion; to produce equivalent income in manufacturing, exports would have to total $320 billion. In estimating the impact of drug money on Mexico, it must therefore be borne in mind that drugs cannot be compared to any conventional export. The drug trade's tremendously high profit margins mean its total impact on Mexico vastly outstrips even the estimated total sales, even if the margins shifted substantially. On the whole, Mexico is a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade. Even if some of the profits are invested overseas, the pool of remaining money flowing into Mexico creates tremendous liquidity in the Mexican economy at a time of global recession. It is difficult to trace where the drug money is going, which follows from its illegality. Certainly, drug dealers would want their money in a jurisdiction where it could not be easily seized even if tracked. U.S. asset seizure laws for drug trafficking make the United States an unlikely haven. Though money clearly flows out of Mexico, the ability of the smugglers to influence the behavior of the Mexican government by investing some of it makes Mexico a likely destination for a substantial portion of such funds. The money does not, however, flow back into the hands of the gunmen shooting it out on the border; even their bosses couldn't manage funds of that magnitude. And while money can be -- and often is -- baled up and hidden, the value of money is in its use. As with illegal money everywhere, the goal is to wash it and invest it in legitimate enterprises where it can produce more money. That means it has to enter the economy through legitimate institutions -- banks and other financial entities -- and then be redeployed into the economy. This is no different from the American Mafia's practice during and after Prohibition. The Drug War and Mexican National Interests From Mexico's point of view, interrupting the flow of drugs to the United States is not clearly in the national interest or in that of the economic elite. Observers often dwell on the warfare between smuggling organizations in the northern borderland but rarely on the flow of American money into Mexico. Certainly, that money could corrupt the Mexican state, but it also behaves as money does. It is accumulated and invested, where it generates wealth and jobs. For the Mexican government to become willing to shut off this flow of money, the violence would have to become far more geographically widespread. And given the difficulty of ending the traffic anyway -- and that many in the state security and military apparatus benefit from it -- an obvious conclusion can be drawn: Namely, it is difficult to foresee scenarios in which the Mexican government could or would stop the drug trade. Instead, Mexico will accept both the pain and the benefits of the drug trade. Mexico's policy is consistent: It makes every effort to appear to be stopping the drug trade so that it will not be accused of supporting it. The government does not object to disrupting one or more of the smuggling groups, so long as the aggregate inflow of cash does not materially decline. It demonstrates to the United States efforts (albeit inadequate) to tackle the trade, while pointing out very real problems with its military and security apparatus and with its officials in Mexico City. It simultaneously points to the United States as the cause of the problem, given Washington's failure to control demand or to reduce prices by legalization. And if massive amounts of money pour into Mexico as a result of this U.S. failure, Mexico is not going to refuse it. The problem with the Mexican military or police is not lack of training or equipment. It is not a lack of leadership. These may be problems, but they are only problems if they interfere with implementing Mexican national policy. The problem is that these forces are personally unmotivated to take the risks needed to be effective because they benefit more from being ineffective. This isn't incompetence but a rational national policy. Moreover, Mexico has deep historic grievances toward the United States dating back to the Mexican-American War. These have been exacerbated by U.S. immigration policy that the Mexicans see both as insulting and as a threat to their policy of exporting surplus labor north. There is thus no desire to solve the Americans' problem. Certainly, there are individuals in the Mexican government who wish to stop the smuggling and the inflow of billions of dollars. They will try. But they will not succeed, as too much is at stake. One must ignore public statements and earnest private assurances and instead observe the facts on the ground to understand what's really going on. The U.S. Strategic Problem And this leaves the United States with a strategic problem. There is some talk in Mexico City and Washington of the Americans becoming involved in suppression of the smuggling within Mexico (even though the cartels, to use that strange name, make certain not to engage in significant violence north of the border and mask it when they do to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexico). This is certainly something the Mexicans would be attracted to. But it is unclear that the Americans would be any more successful than the Mexicans. What is clear is that any U.S. intervention would turn Mexican drug traffickers into patriots fighting yet another Yankee incursion. Recall that Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, but he did help turn Villa into a national hero in Mexico. The United States has a number of choices. It could accept the status quo. It could figure out how to reduce drug demand in the United States while keeping drugs illegal. It could legalize drugs, thereby driving their price down and ending the motivation for smuggling. And it could move into Mexico in a bid to impose its will against a government, banking system and police and military force that benefit from the drug trade. The United States does not know how to reduce demand for drugs. The United States is not prepared to legalize drugs. This means the choice lies between the status quo and a complex and uncertain (to say the least) intervention. We suspect the United States will attempt some limited variety of the latter, while in effect following the current strategy and living with the problem. Ultimately, Mexico is a failed state only if you accept the idea that its goal is to crush the smugglers. If, on the other hand, one accepts the idea that all of Mexican society benefits from the inflow of billions of American dollars (even though it also pays a price), then the Mexican state has not failed -- it is following a rational strategy to turn a national problem into a national benefit.

#### No impact – no acquisition, environment and hurt dispersal, empirics

Leitenberg 5— Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles) Ellipses in original

Five essential requirements must be mastered in order to produce biological agents: • One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen. • One must know how to handle the organism correctly. • One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics. • One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up production properly. • One must know how to disperse the product properly. 139 A U.S. military field manual dating back to the 1960s remarks on the attributes of a desirable BW agent, that in addition to its pathogenicity, “means must be available for maintaining the agent’s virulence or infectivity during production, storage, and transportation.” 140 One should add, most particularly during its dispersal as well. Two members of Sweden’s biodefense program stress methods on how to optimize formulations of BW agents as the most critical step of all: “They key competence is . . . how to formulate the organisms to facilitate aerosolization of particles that cause severe disease by inhalation.” 141 It is interesting that the classified 1999 DIA report quoted earlier in the section on state programs contained a single sentence regarding the possible use of BW agents by terrorist groups: “Terrorist use should also be anticipated primarily in improvised devices, probably in association with an explosive.” 142 No anticipation of the capability for aerosol distribution was mentioned, no overflight of cities, sports stadiums, etc. In a recent BW “Risk Assessment” published elsewhere, a group of authors from the Sandia National Laboratory listed a series of factors closely paralleling the above as “Technical Hurdles to Successful BW Deployment”: acquisition of a virulent agent; production of the agent in suitable form and quantity; and, effective deployment of the agent. This was summed up in simple words as “obtaining a pathogen or toxin . . ., isolation, amplification, protection against environmental degradation, and development of an effective dissemination method.” They concluded that “Even a low-consequence event requires a 47 considerable level of expertise to execute.” 143 Dr. Steven Block, Chair of the U.S. DoD Defense Science Board Summer Study on biological weapons in the late 1990s explained the same requirements. A lesson from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that any group bent on developing offensive bio-weapons capabilities must overcome two significant problems, one biological and the other physical. First, it must acquire and produce stable quantities of a suitably potent agent. For a variety of reasons, this is not the trivial task that it is sometimes made out to be. Second, it must have an effective means of delivering the agent to the intended target. For most, but not all, bio-weapon agents, this translates into solving problems of dispersal. Programs in both the United States and the USSR devoted years of effort to perfecting these aspects. 144 Unfortunately, a recent example provides the sort of grossly uninformed description that is more frequently provided to the general public. Speaking at the Harvard Medical School on June 1, 2005, and trading on his training as a medical doctor as he frequently does, Senator Frist claimed that “. . . a few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently innocuous setting [could] mount a first- order biological attack. It is even possible to synthesize virulent pathogens from scratch, or to engineer and manufacture prions . . .” He repeated that this was “the single greatest threat to our safety and security today.” 145 The remarks are a travesty: “. . . a few technicians . . . middling skill . . . few thousand dollars,” leading to a “first-order ading to a “ ading to a “ ” a biological attack, and additionally extending this to “synthesizing virulent pathogens” in the same breath. To bolster his argument, Senator Frist larded his presentation with other gross inaccuracies, claiming that “During the Cold War, the Soviet Union . . . stockpiled 5,000 tons annually of biowarfare- engineered anthrax resistant to 16 antibiotics.” The only source in the world for the tonnage of anthrax stockpiled by the USSR is Dr. Ken Alibek. 146 He has never quoted a figure higher than 200 tons, and he has never claimed that the 200 tons was produced “annually,” or in any single year. The USSR’s anthrax stockpile consisted of a genetically unmodified classical strain (or strains). 147 The antibiotic resistant strain which was developed by Soviet BW laboratories in the mid- to late-1980s was not resistant to 16 antibiotics, but to half that number, and had not yet reached the point of being stockpiled Page 56 48 by the time that the Soviet BW program began to be cut back in 1989. Finally, the 5,000-ton figure is the approximate sum of the annual production capacities of all Soviet-era BW mobilization production facilities that would have initiated production only with the onset of, or just prior to a (nuclear) war with the United States. No such quantities of BW agents were ever produced in the USSR

#### No extinction – Tamil tigers prove

O’Neill 4O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

#### No impact to heg – empirics

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

**Their internal link can’t affect the structural reasons why heg solves war**

**Maher 11**—adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1, Amiles)

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America’s fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and **this gap will not close in the next several decades at least**. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and **overwhelming legitimacy**. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history’s only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America’s strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions. The United States enjoys better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors. South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but perhaps **even** **Beijing views the American military presence** in East Asia **as an assurance against Japanese revanchism**), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact view good relations with the United States as **indispensable** for their own security.

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Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

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# 2NC

### 2NC – Overview

#### The counterplan solves the entire case – the net benefit is energy industry competitiveness. It passes the THA but excludes Article 20 of the agreement which contains Rule 13q-1.

#### Before I do the net benefit debate, I’ll deal with CP solvency – they need quantitative evidence that identifies and impacts a reason why Rule 13-q-1 is good and they don’t have it.

#### It’s bad – collapses the energy industry: that’s Geman – disclosure laws make US-listed companies less competitive which gives oil companies an incentive to license overseas and shift production away.

#### That causes industry offshoring – competitiveness and pricing are the key internal link – that’s Rapoza.

#### That’s key to growth – they conceded its good – that’s O’Hanlon – solves extinction k2 foreign policy effectiveness and agenda pushing which turns hegemony because absent growth, no incentive to listen to us – oil’s good b/c jobs, multiplier – that’s Pipeline and Gas Journal.

### 2NC – Turns solvency

#### Plan reduces US drilling – kills competitiveness and profit incentive

Simmons 4/24 (Dan, director of the Institute for Energy Research’s State and Regulatory Affairs division, former research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, former Director of the Natural Resources Task Force at the American Legislative Exchange Council, BA in economics from Utah State University and a JD from GMU School of Law, member of the Virginia State Bar, Institute for Energy Research, April 24, 2013, “IER’s Simmons to Testify on Hydrocarbons Agreement,” <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/04/24/testimony-of-daniel-simmons-subcommittee-on-energy-and-mineral-resources/>, alp)

Rule 13q-1 also creates a different type of competitive disadvantage for American companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico Transboundary area. The rule would allow foreign state-owned oil companies with a competitive advantage to consider business-sensitive information about American companies’ operations. If Mexico were to allow foreign-owned companies to extract oil along the deepwater transboundary area, there could very well be competition between U.S. private companies and foreign-state owned companies. Even though the deepwater technology was developed in the U.S. deepwater, the U.S. companies would be at a disadvantage. This is like playing poker but being required to show your cards to your fellow card-players. Therefore, the authors of HR 1613 are to be commended for recognizing this and taking proper steps to isolate this unique agreement from the uncertainties surrounding 13q.

### 2NC – AT: Perm do the CP

#### Permutation is severance – normal means is disclosure according to the THA text. It’s a voter for fairness:

* Steals neg ground and makes topical and germane pics uncompetitive – hurts education and specificity which turns their standards

#### It’s also a voter for education:

#### Normal means is disclosure – TBA text proves

Gary 5/9 (Ian, senior policy manager for extractive industries at Oxfam America, Oxfam America, May 9th, 2013, “A back door attack on oil payment transparency,” <http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-door-attack-on-oil-payment-transparency/>, alp)

The US-Mexico TBA requires that certain information be kept confidential unless disclosure is required by law. The TBA text demonstrates that the US and Mexico have already made the correct policy judgment that the specific confidentiality provisions of the TBA should be subordinated to each country’s commitment to openness and subject to each country’s disclosure requirements. Nothing in the TBA would require the exemption provided by H.R. 1613. Tellingly, the Senate Energy Committee has introduced a bi-partisan bill, S. 812, sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) to approve the US-Mexico TBA, and it contains no Section 1504 exemption provision. If Congress is truly interested in approving this agreement and providing the “rules of the road” for joint development of oil and gas reserves straddling the US-Mexico maritime boundary, then it should adopt the clean Senate bill without the reporting exemption. Former Senator Jeff Bingaman, past Senate Energy Committee chairman, told Reuters that the exemption proposed by the House “complicates things significantly” for passage of the bill. Referring to the Section 1504 exemption language, he said, “They’ve added in some things that are going to make it difficult to pass in that form.” The Mexican Congress ratified the TBA a year ago, and the Obama administration – and the oil industry – would like to see it approved. The Obama administration, though, has made clear that implementation of Section 1504 is a priority.

#### Our interpretation is least necessary means for passage – Obama’s threatened to veto the CP which means it faces strong opposition – normal means is without the exemption

Geman 6/25 (Ben, The Hill, June 25, 2013, “White House ‘cannot support’ House US-Mexico drilling bill,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/307769-white-house-cannot-support-house-us-mexico-drilling-bill>, alp)

The White House said Tuesday that it opposes House legislation to implement a 2012 administration pact with Mexico on Gulf of Mexico drilling cooperation, citing “unnecessary, extraneous provisions that seriously detract from the bill.” The formal statement of administration policy backs the “goal” of the bill that’s coming to the House floor Wednesday to implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. But it cites provisions in the GOP-crafted bill that exempts oil companies operating under the pact from controversial federal rules that force energy producers to disclose their payments to foreign governments. “As a practical matter, this provision would waive the requirement for the disclosure of any payments made by resource extraction companies to the United States or foreign governments in accordance with a transboundary hydrocarbon agreement. The provision directly and negatively impacts U.S. efforts to increase transparency and accountability, particularly in the oil, gas, and minerals sectors,” the White House Office of Management and Budget said. The White House statement, however, stops short of a veto threat despite saying it "cannot support" the measure. It says the administration looks forward to working with Congress on an implementing bill. Click here for much more on the House bill and its controversial exemption from rules required under the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial overhaul law. The Senate version of the implementing bill, sponsored by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate’s energy committee, does not include the exemption from the Securities and Exchange Commission payment disclosure rules. But proponents of the House measure say the carve-out is needed to prevent a collision with confidentiality provisions in the U.S.-Mexico accord. The underlying 2012 U.S.-Mexico accord, which has support from Republicans and the administration, is designed to enable cooperation in development of oil-and-gas along a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. “Implementing this Agreement will offer significant opportunities for responsible and efficient exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources in an expanded area along the U.S.-Mexico maritime boundary as well as significant new opportunities for U.S. companies,” the White House said. In a separate statement Tuesday, the White House threatened to veto a separate GOP bill coming to the House floor Wednesday that would require a major expansion of offshore oil-and-gas leasing. The House has passed similar measures in the last Congress but they did not come up in the Senate. From the White House statement: This action would be directed without Secretarial discretion to determine whether those areas are appropriate for leasing through balanced consideration of factors such as resource potential, State and local views and concerns, and the maturity of infrastructure needed to support oil and gas development, including response capabilities in the event of an oil spill. The bill would mandate OCS lease sales along the east and west coast and elsewhere with inadequate consideration of military use conflicts and without regard for significant issues, such as State and local concerns and impacts on important commercial and recreational fisheries.

### 2NC – DA Dodd-Frank bad (econ)

#### The CP also leads to a wider repeal of Dodd-Frank

Geman 4/25 (Ben, The Hill, April 25, 2013, “House GOP moves to shield oil companies from disclosure rule,” [http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rules](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296235-house-gop-moves-to-shield-oil-companies-from-disclosure-rulesm), alp)

But Oxfam America, which is a major backer of the SEC rules, criticized the exemption and is concerned the bill is part of a wider effort to repeal the Dodd-Frank provision.

#### Dodd-Frank bad – collapses the economy and violates the constitution

Simon 12 (Ammon, policy counsel at the Judicial Crisis Network, assistant attorney general and Columbia Law School Fellow at the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, graduate of Wheaton College, law degree from Columbia Law School, writer for the National Review, National Review Bench Memos, July 25, 2012, “Dodd-Frank at Two: Bad for Business and the Constitution,” <http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/312267/dodd-frank-two-bad-business-and-constitution-ammon-simon>, alp)

Dodd–Frank, President Obama’s financial-regulation reform, had its two-year anniversary over the weekend. The act, spanning 2,319-pages, is an embodiment of former White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel’s maxim to never let a serious crisis “go to waste.” Capitalizing on the fervor after the 2008 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank purported to promote financial stability, accountability, and transparency. Unfortunately, we would have all been better off if the crisis had been “wasted” than used to pass this legislation. Not surprisingly, much of why Dodd-Frank is damaging for our economy — including its massive regulatory structure and its contribution to economic uncertainty — could be remedied by addressing Dodd-Frank’s constitutional problems. Dodd-Frank hurts our economy because one of its central premises is that bureaucratic experts with near-unlimited discretion make the best stewards of our economy. These experts believe that if they promulgate enough rules, they can somehow fix our complicated financial system. In Dodd-Frank, this has already led to more than 8,000 pages of regulations, and regulators are only about 30 percent finished. This contributes to an increasingly regulated but tepid economic climate. As the Economist explained, Dodd-Frank “will smother financial institutions in so much red tape that innovation is stifled and America’s economy suffers.” The House Committee on Financial Services estimated that complying with the law will take about 24 million labor hours a year, or, as the Financial Services Roundtable explained, require that businesses hire about 26,477 personnel just to comply with those already-finalized regulations. This outsized trust in bureaucratic experts inevitably breeds destructive economic uncertainty; businesses cannot decipher their regulatory obligations or must wait years to do so. Last year, former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan examined how our government’s uncertain regulatory regime has influenced economic growth. He found that 50 to 75 percent of the significant reduction in long-term investment in our economy “can be explained by the shock of vastly greater uncertainties embedded in the competitive, regulatory and financial environments faced by businesses . . . deriving from the surge in government activism.” Dodd-Frank’s flawed regulatory approach has a partial constitutional solution: forcing Congress to provide concrete guidance to administrative agencies, an aim of the broader separation of powers challenge to Dodd-Frank. Administrative agencies, which follow legislative guidance to write regulations, may use discretion in enforcing laws. But the Constitution requires that Congress still decide the basic policy questions by providing an “intelligible principle” for all enactments. This provides at least some economic certainty for businesses, who could turn to the “intelligible principle” for guidance, knowing that it constrains regulators. Furthermore, forcing Congress to answer instead of punt the hard policy questions might make passing legislation more difficult or render certain detailed regulatory interventions impractical. This does not require closing administrative agencies or disavowing all complicated government interventions, but it is a reasonable check on government’s regulatory power. Dodd Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), a legalized corporate death panel, is a useful case study for how Dodd-Frank’s constitutional and economic issues intersect. The OLA lets the Treasury Secretary, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve authorize an FDIC-led liquidation of a financial company if, among other things, it is (1) “in default, or in danger of default,” and its (2) failure “would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” Once authorized, the FDIC essentially steps into the shoes of the company’s board of directors and can commence winding down the company as it sees fit. This includes the possibility of ignoring the bankruptcy code’s stable rules for resolving a failing institution. These guidelines do not bother to provide regulators with an intelligible principle to constrain their interventions, instead trusting in the FDIC to take over and run a complicated business during the height of a financial crisis. This unleashes economic uncertainty about any number of major financial companies’ fates during the worst time — a financial crisis. Will we ever know how close to default must a company be for the OLA to be applicable? How serious must the effects on financial stability be? When and how will the FDIC forgo the stable rules provided by the bankruptcy code in favor of its own regulatory judgment? Columbia Law professor Jeffrey Gordon has explained that during a financial crisis Dodd-Frank, and the OLA in particular, would result in “the nationalization of the financial sector, an untested and potentially destabilizing intervention, the mere threat of which could hasten a slide from financial instability into financial emergency.” These are not just theoretical concerns, but rather, very practical problems that prevent Dodd-Frank from aligning with both our Constitution and sound economic policy.

#### That’s a d-rule

Levinson 2k Daryl Levinson, professor of law at University of Virginia, Spring 2000 UC Law Review

Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation, for we do not usually think of violations of constitutional rights in terms of cost-benefit analysis and efficiency. Quite the opposite, constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as deontological side-constraints that trump even utility-maximizing government action. Alternatively, constitutional rights might be understood as serving rule-utilitarian purposes. If the disutility to victims of constitutional violations often exceeds the social benefits derived from the rights-violating activity, or if rights violations create long-term costs that outweigh short-term social benefits, then constitutional rights can be justified as tending to maximize global utility, even though this requires local utility-decreasing steps. Both the deontological and rule-utilitarian descriptions imply that the optimal level of constitutional violations is zero; that is, society would be better off, by whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never violated.

### 2NC – AT: Perm do both

#### Perm fails – exempting and requiring disclosure creates legal uncertainty – that turns solvency

Simmons 4/24 (Dan, director of the Institute for Energy Research’s State and Regulatory Affairs division, former research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, former Director of the Natural Resources Task Force at the American Legislative Exchange Council, BA in economics from Utah State University and a JD from GMU School of Law, member of the Virginia State Bar, Institute for Energy Research, April 24, 2013, “IER’s Simmons to Testify on Hydrocarbons Agreement,” <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/04/24/testimony-of-daniel-simmons-subcommittee-on-energy-and-mineral-resources/>, alp)

While the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement is a good agreement that will aid both the United States and Mexico, one potential problem is a conflict between Article 20 of the agreement and the Security and Exchange Commission’s Rule 13q-1 regarding Resource Extraction Payments. Article 20 states: To the extent consistent with their national laws, the Parties shall maintain confidential, and obligate their Licensees to maintain confidential, all Confidential Data and other information obtained from the other Party or its Licensees in accordance with this Agreement. Together with Rule 13q-1, requiring “resource extraction issuers” to disclose payments made to foreign governments, Article 20 can create an impossible situation for American companies operating on transboundary hydrocarbon resources. For example, Mexican confidentiality requirements may forbid the disclosure of the very information that Rule 13q-1 requires American companies[23] to disclose. This would lead to a situation where companies regulated by the SEC have, at very least, uncertainty about compliance with both Mexican and American disclosure laws. This uncertainty and potential disclosure conflict would place foreign state-owned oil companies, who are not regulated by the SEC, at a competitive advantage to the companies which operate in the United States are regulated by the SEC. Because much of the transboundary area is deepwater, it would require multi-billion dollar investments to produce the hydrocarbon resources. Any legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could easily dissuade American companies from undertaking what is already an expensive decision, in turn reducing opportunities for new jobs for Americans.

## Econ

### 2NC – Alt causes to PEMEX

#### IOC investment isn’t sufficient to solve PEMEX:

#### a) Profit siphoning – means no capital for reinvestment which prevents reserve production.

#### b) Unions – can’t fire workers which means it can’t downsize – bloated wage costs suck up private investment without going towards drilling.

#### c) Refining – star this – PEMEX’s production division is ok – refining is a toilet – aff doesn’t solve because it doesn’t modernize refining. Oil can’t be sold if it’s impure so this is a terminal bottleneck.

#### d) Framing – if the 1AR drops one or doesn’t read a card, they lose the advantage.

#### And the TBA’s a first step but is insufficient:

#### 1) US and Mexico regulation

McLaughlin 12 (Richard J., professor at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies at Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi, endowed chair of Marine Policy and Law, lecturer at various academic institutions including Cambridge University, the University of California – Berkeley, the University of Hawaii, the University of Miami, the University of Oregon, former professor of law and Louise Stewart Lecturer at the University of Mississippi School of Law, former director of the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program, JD from Tulane University and JSD doctorate in law from UC – Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School of Law, LLM masters in marine law and policy from the University of Washington School of Law, LOSI conference papers 2012, May 21-24, 2012, “Understanding the Recent U.S. and Mexico Treaty on Shared Hydrocarbons: Moving Toward Transboundary Marine Energy Security in the Gulf of Mexico,” <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/McLaughlin-final.pdf>, ellipses inserted [nothing sketchy though – I promise], alp)

The Agreement will enter into force pending the ratification of the treaty by the U.S. Senate and the setting up of the internal regulations for permits and licenses for U.S. operators in order to carry out the Agreement.15 Significantly more thorough legal and regulatory reform is needed in Mexico before the Agreement can be effectively implemented. Upon entry into force, the Agreement will terminate the moratorium on drilling in the area known as the Western Gap which was implemented by the Western Gap Treaty on June 9, 2000. […] As is readily apparent from this brief article, offshore transboundary hydrocarbon exploitation triggers a broad range of legal and policy challenges. The Agreement, while a rather positive first step, is as notable for what it lacks as for what it contains. It was clearly the intention of both nations to leave some sections of the treaty indefinite and ambiguous so that details could be clarified in later negotiations or developed through state practice. Legitimate questions are raised as to whether Mexico’s current constitutional and legal framework will allow this Agreement to be carried out in a successful manner.44 Similar questions emerge on the U.S. side of the boundary. The U.S. has never been a party to an international agreement to jointly develop hydrocarbon resources that extend across international boundaries.45 Consequently, it will have to develop a completely new regulatory structure capable of governing the unique set of issues common to international unitization agreements.

#### 2) Mexican constitution – blocks unitization

McLaughlin 12 (Richard J., professor at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies at Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi, endowed chair of Marine Policy and Law, lecturer at various academic institutions including Cambridge University, the University of California – Berkeley, the University of Hawaii, the University of Miami, the University of Oregon, former professor of law and Louise Stewart Lecturer at the University of Mississippi School of Law, former director of the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program, JD from Tulane University and JSD doctorate in law from UC – Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School of Law, LLM masters in marine law and policy from the University of Washington School of Law, LOSI conference papers 2012, May 21-24, 2012, “Understanding the Recent U.S. and Mexico Treaty on Shared Hydrocarbons: Moving Toward Transboundary Marine Energy Security in the Gulf of Mexico,” <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/McLaughlin-final.pdf>, alp)

Chapter 2 deals with the exploration and exploitation of a transboundary reservoir or unit and it is here that the Agreement’s emphasis on the principle of unitization is explained. Article 6 requires that any joint exploration or exploitation of a transboundary reservoir pursuant to a unitization agreement must be approved by both the U.S. and Mexico. In addition, the executive agencies are required to make a joint determination estimating the amount of recoverable hydrocarbons in the transboundary reservoir and the amount on either side of the maritime boundary.25 Along with this estimate the parties will have to jointly determine the associated allocation of production26 and in the event the executive agencies are unable to reach this determination, the question will be submitted to expert determination.27 Although it highly encourages unitization, it is possible under the agreement for a licensee to proceed with exploitation of a transboundary reservoir without having to unitize. If either of the parties does not approve a licensee’s unitization proposal or if any licensee fails to sign a unitization agreement after it has been approved, then either nation may authorize its licensee to proceed with the exploitation of the reservoir.28 The non- unitizing licensee however, will, among other things, still be subject to the determination of allocation of production mentioned above and required to share production data on a monthly basis.29 It is worth noting that, in order for unitization to legally occur in Mexico, it is widely opined that the nation’s constitution will need to be amended.

#### Terrorists won’t use the border:

#### a) Canada – large border, lack of enforcement, and airports – there are known terrorists there – that’s Mora.

#### b) Empirics – FBI records show Mexico is safer than legal visas.

#### And no impact:

#### 1) Experts – no risk and counterterror increasing

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.

#### 2) Greencards – 9/11 proves

McCombs and Steller 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, <http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html>)

Over the last two decades, almost all of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on legal visas or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border heavily guarded, but the Mexican government makes an extraordinary effort to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico shares real-time information with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said. The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have no interest in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either, he said. "If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits," he said. Being associated with terrorist groups would be very bad for business for drug-smuggling organizations, said Sylvia Longmire, a drug-war analyst and author. Proof of a terrorist coming through Mexico would have dire consequences for the Mexican government, too, she said. But that point of view ignores the fact that terrorist groups and Latin American drug smugglers sometimes do business with each other and therefore have connections, said Braun, the former DEA operations chief, who now runs a security-consulting firm, Spectre Group International. "Hezbollah is now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade," Braun said. "Most of the cocaine they're involved in distributing is heading toward Europe, but they're affiliating with the same cartels sending drugs to the United States." That isn't to say the groups share an ideology, but simply that they have the connections needed to exploit smuggling routes into the United States. Also, people from the Middle East tend to have dark hair, dark eyes and olive skin, like most Latin Americans, so they can easily blend in, he said. "On a moonless night at two in the morning, there's not a lot of due diligence going on when the coyotes and gatekeepers are moving human traffic across that border," Braun said. Canada is a more likely crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers, said Henry Willis, a senior policy researcher on homeland security at the Rand Corp. "To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism,' as the Border Patrol does, is folly," wrote Barry, of the Center for International Policy, in a recent report. People have talked about terrorists crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, but Anthony Coulson, who retired as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Tucson office last year, has seen hardly any evidence. "Through the years I can probably count on my fingers on one hand the number of times that there was some type of terrorist activity associated with the border," Coulson said. "It just doesn't happen."

#### 3) Fearmongering

McCombs and Steller, 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article\_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html)

A turning political tide has renewed fears that raged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks - that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. Nobody disputes that's possible, but analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use other routes into the country, if they're not here already. It's much more common for people convicted in the U.S. of crimes connected to international terrorism to have been U.S. citizens or legal residents, or come into the country on visas. "There is no serious evidence that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism," said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank based in New York. Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, said Tom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "It's politically motivated," Barry said, "playing on that sense of fear that certain people are susceptible to." But proponents of tougher border enforcement say protecting Americans against terrorism motivates them, not politics. "There's an enormous risk," said Michael Braun, who retired as chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. Members of Hezbollah, for example, "are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures on many borders around the world where they operate." The State Department's 2009 "Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "no known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory." The State Department said that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican organized crime and international terrorist groups. But it warns: "The violence attributed to organized-crime groups on the border, however, continued to strain Mexico's law-enforcement capacities, creating potential vulnerabilities that terrorists seeking access to the United States could exploit." Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu emphasized the risk of terrorists crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in a May 26 open letter to President Obama. "If the majority of regular illegal immigrants can sneak into America, what does this say about the ability of terrorist sleeper cells?" Babeu wrote. "The porous U.S.-Mexican border is the gravest national-security threat facing America." Hiding in a car trunk In his letter to the president, Babeu said thousands of illegal immigrants hailing from "special-interest countries" make the U.S.-Mexico border a national-security threat. "In some cases, we have confirmed their troubling ties to terrorism," Babeu wrote. "Yet for those we apprehend, how many today live amongst us?" The Border Patrol apprehended an average of 339 people from "special-interest countries" - those that warrant special handling based on terrorism risk factors - at the U.S.-Mexico border each year over the past six years, Homeland Security data show. That's less than 1 percent each year of the total apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, Homeland Security figures show. None of the 2,039 people arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border in that span presented a credible terrorist threat, Homeland Security officials say. Homeland Security monitors, analyzes and gathers intelligence about potential threats but at this time "does not have any credible information on terrorist groups operating along the Southwest border," said department spokesman Matt Chandler. Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism last year, none came into the United States from Mexico. Half were U.S. citizens, most of them naturalized from countries such as Sudan or Somalia. Seven were extradited from other countries, while three were captured abroad by American forces. The others came to the United States on visas, or, in one case, were arrested while trying to come into the United States legally at a port of entry on the Canadian border.

### 2NC – No investment

#### Aff fails – no investment:

#### a) Pact for Mexico – nationalism prohibits cooperation.

#### b) No incentive – the TBA is a profit sharing, not production sharing agreement – prevents IOCs from owning reserves in the Gulf which means they can’t report future profits to investors.

#### And disclosure clause prevents investment

Simmons 4/30 (Daniel, Director of Regulatory and State Affairs at the Institute for Energy Research, BA in economics from Utah State University, J.D. from George Mason University School of Law, Master Resource: A free-market energy blog, April 30, 2013, “U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement: A Rare Victory for Oil and Gas in the Obama Era,” <http://www.masterresource.org/2013/04/u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement/>, alp)

In an otherwise good agreement, one potential problem is a conflict between Article 20 of the agreement and the Security and Exchange Commission’s Rule 13q-1 regarding Resource Extraction Payments. Article 20 states: To the extent consistent with their national laws, the Parties shall maintain confidential, and obligate their Licensees to maintain confidential, all Confidential Data and other information obtained from the other Party or its Licensees in accordance with this Agreement. Together with Rule 13q-1, requiring “resource extraction issuers” to disclose payments made to foreign governments, Article 20 can create an impossible situation for American companies operating on transboundary hydrocarbon resources. For example, Mexican confidentiality requirements may forbid the disclosure of the very information that Rule 13q-1 requires American companies to disclose. This would lead to a situation where companies regulated by the SEC have, at very least, uncertainty about compliance with both Mexican and American disclosure laws. This uncertainty and potential disclosure conflict would place foreign state-owned oil companies, who are not regulated by the SEC, at a competitive advantage to the companies which operate in the United States are regulated by the SEC. Because much of the transboundary area is deepwater, it would require multi-billion dollar investments to produce the hydrocarbon resources. Any legal uncertainty brought about by disclosure law could easily dissuade American companies from undertaking what is already an expensive decision, in turn reducing opportunities for new jobs for Americans. Rule 13q-1 also creates a different type of competitive disadvantage for American companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico Transboundary area. The rule would allow foreign state-owned oil companies with a competitive advantage to consider business-sensitive information about American companies’ operations. If Mexico were to allow foreign-owned companies to extract oil along the deepwater transboundary area, there could very well be competition between U.S. private companies and foreign-state owned companies. Even though the deepwater technology was developed in the U.S. deepwater, the U.S. companies would be at a disadvantage. This is like playing poker but being required to show your cards to your fellow card-players.

### **2NC – AT: Bioweapons**

#### No impact – no acquisition, environment and hurt dispersal, empirics

Leitenberg 5— Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles) Ellipses in original

#### No risk and border counterterror increasing

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

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#### No extinction – Tamil tigers prove

O’Neill 4O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony

#### No impact to heg – empirics

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

**Their internal link can’t affect the structural reasons why heg solves war**

**Maher 11**—adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1, Amiles)

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America’s fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and **this gap will not close in the next several decades at least**. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and **overwhelming legitimacy**. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history’s only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America’s strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions. The United States enjoys better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors. South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but perhaps **even** **Beijing views the American military presence** in East Asia **as an assurance against Japanese revanchism**), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact view good relations with the United States as **indispensable** for their own security.

## Enviro

### 2NC – Spills now

#### Spills now – no impact uniqueness:

#### a) ERT spill – 4 miles wide near the coast – Coast Guard response proves either they cleanup or the aff can’t.

#### b) Recency – new spills in Mexico just happened – we postdate

Sellers 9/11 (Christopher, Truth-Out, September 11, 2013, “The Environmental Consequences of Privatizing Mexico's Oil,” <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/18768-the-environmental-consequences-of-privatizing-mexicos-oil>, alp)

On August 16, an eight-inch pipeline ruptured at Mexico’s oldest refinery in Minatitlán in the south of Veracruz state. Even as oily wastes poured into the Coatzacoalcos River, stretching out twenty miles by the day’s end, a group of long-time residents meeting in this same city recalled the long, damaging toll that the petrochemical industry has inflicted on the environment and people of this region. But their harrowing past and present have barely registered in the many headlines that Mexican oil was making in this nation’s capital, as well as leading American newspapers. There, for the past few weeks, talk has swirled around the new Mexican president’s proposal to (more or less) privatize the country’s oil industry, for well over half a century run by the Mexican state.

#### And BP spill makes contamination inev

Niland 8/22 (Kurt, reporter, internally citing studies by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Dr. Paul Sammarco of the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium, and Dr. Riki Ott, a marine toxicologist who studied the environmental impact of the BP spill and the Exxon-Valdez spill, Righting Injustice, August 22, 2013, “New Study Finds BP Oil Spill Pollution Much Worse Than Previous Government Findings,” <http://www.rightinginjustice.com/news/2013/08/22/new-study-finds-bp-oil-spill-pollution-much-worse-than-previous-government-findings/>, alp)

Researchers have found significantly higher contamination levels in water, sediment, and seafood collected from the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 during and after BP’s massive Deepwater Horizon oil spill than scientists from federal agencies found, a new report published in the Marine Pollution Journal reveals. According to the New York Times, the study’s findings cast doubts on the sampling methods used by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and its results, which the agency used to determine where and when to reopen 88,000 square miles of Gulf waters closed to commercial and recreational fishing after the spill. Other non-government studies conducted previously echo the new study’s findings, indicating that levels and distribution of oil contamination were much worse than the U.S. government’s findings. BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and sank on April 20, 2010, killing 11 workers and releasing more than 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf. Part of BP’s cleanup strategy involved dumping about two million gallons of Corexit oil dispersant onto the spill while injecting it as it gushed out of the Macondo well about a mile below the surface. The scale of BP’s Corexit use and its untested methods continue to raise concerns that the company may have made the oil spill longer lasting and much more toxic than it would have been otherwise. One sampling method the NOAA used to determine Gulf toxicity levels involved a device called a Niskin bottle, which collects samples from one point in the water. Dr. Paul Sammarco of the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium said that approach probably wasn’t accurate because BP’s heavy use of Corexit oil dispersants created a patchy environment, making sampling hit or miss situation. Dr. Sammarco also said that the plastic used to make the bottles attracts oily compounds, potentially removing them from the water sample and creating lower contaminant levels in the readings. Dr. Riki Ott, a marine toxicologist who has studied the environmental impact of the BP oil spill and the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska told the New York Times that she was “totally shocked” by the higher numbers in Dr. Sammarco’s study. “To see NOAA doing this, that’s inexcusable,” Dr. Ott told the New York Times, referring to the Niskin bottle method. “It has been known since Exxon Valdez that this spotty sampling does not work.” Because the potential exists for regions of the Gulf to remain polluted with carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and volatile organic compounds, which can impair the immune and nervous systems, Dr. Sammarco recommended that better monitoring be in place before reopening fisheries. “It’s a good idea to follow these things long term, to make sure the runway is clear so people are safe and the food is safe,” he told the New York Times.

### 2NC – Aff doesn’t solve safety

#### 1) Funding – insufficient, even if regulations work

Manuel 13 (Athan, director of the Sierra Club’s Lands Protection Program, presentation before the House Committee on Natural Resources’ Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, United States House of Representatives, April 23, 2013, “Testimony of Athan Manuel,” <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20130425/100755/HHRG-113-II06-Wstate-ManuelA-20130425.pdf>, alp)

Note: BSEE = Bureau of Safety and Environment Enforcement

One goal of the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement is to hold joint inspections of off shore drilling regulations. 2 The Sierra Club supports the reforms and regulations put in place by the Obama Administration, the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. Regulations that require operators to demonstrate that they are prepared to deal with the potential for a blowout and worst-case discharge, and mandating that permit applications for drilling projects must meet new standards for well-design, casing, and cementing, and be independently certified by a professional engineer per BOEM’s Drilling Safety Rule. We also support the guidance requiring a corporate compliance statement and review of subsea blowout containment resources for deep-water drilling. We hope all these standards will be applied to the nearly 1.5 million acres of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf that could be leased as part of the Transboundary Agreement. However, while these reforms have strengthened BSEE’s inspection and oversight capabilities, funding levels remain far below what would be needed for frequent and thorough inspections. Low inspection rates not only undermine regulatory compliance by reducing the odds that violations will be observed, but also limit real-time monitoring of operations by inspectors. The explosion at the West, Texas fertilizer plant, which as last expected by OSHA in 1985, is one recent and vivid example. The best way to avoid another Deepwater Horizon spill is to increase monitoring and inspections, whether in areas currently open for drilling or the areas to be opened by the Transboundary Agreement. Despite these tough new regulations, the U.S. lags behind the rest of the developed world when it comes to inspectors available and trained to inspect the oil and gas rigs off our coasts. The number of inspectors per offshore oil rig in other developed countries is as follows: In the U.K., the inspector to rig ratio is 1: 2.78 In Norway, the inspector to rig ratio is 1:1.05 In the U.S., the inspector to rig ratio is 1: 29.

#### 2) Incentives fail

Manuel 13 (Athan, director of the Sierra Club’s Lands Protection Program, presentation before the House Committee on Natural Resources’ Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, United States House of Representatives, April 23, 2013, “Testimony of Athan Manuel,” <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20130425/100755/HHRG-113-II06-Wstate-ManuelA-20130425.pdf>, alp)

Note: BSEE = Bureau of Safety and Environment Enforcement

The Sierra Club also feels that BSEE’s civil penalties are too small to ensure compliance and deter risk taking by the oil and gas industry. The penalty for violating regulations is only $40,000 per day, per incident. Considering that the daily operating costs of a drilling rig can range up to $1 million, a $40,000 a day fine is not an adequate disincentive. We feel that raising the maximum fine BSEE can assess for civil penalties to a level comparable with operational costs is warranted, and should be added to H.R. 1613 and applied to the area opened for drilling in the Transboundary Agreement.

#### 3) Operator error and maintenance failures – BP proves

Manuel 13 (Athan, director of the Sierra Club’s Lands Protection Program, presentation before the House Committee on Natural Resources’ Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, United States House of Representatives, April 23, 2013, “Testimony of Athan Manuel,” <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20130425/100755/HHRG-113-II06-Wstate-ManuelA-20130425.pdf>, alp)

Note: BSEE = Bureau of Safety and Environment Enforcement

The regulations in the Final Drilling Safety represent positive reforms that are an improvement from the pre-Deepwater Horizon statutes. However, we feel that some improvement is needed, and that these improvements should be amended to H.R. 1613. Improved maintenance and training are both positive reforms that can reduce chances of equipment failure and operator error and thus increase safety. Yet of all the provisions in the Final Drilling Safety Rule, training and maintenance regulations are the most dependent on the robustness of BSEE’s oversight and inspection capabilities. Maintenance is an ongoing concern that necessitates being frequently checked and inspected and training is only valuable if it translates into appropriate actions, which also requires continuous oversight to ensure. The Final Drilling Safety Rule requires drilling wells to be equipped with two independent barriers to flow. If correctly installed, these barriers could in fact protect against blowouts. However, the requirements for two barriers to flow can easily be undermined by operator error. This problem is illustrated by the Deepwater Horizon disaster, where a cement job, a common barrier to flow, was compromised by numerous operator errors. With limited funds for inspection and oversight, and perverse economics that incentivize project speed over safety, it is likely that not all barriers will be properly installed.

### 2NC – AT: Gulf biodiversity

#### No impact – Gulf biodiversity’s resilient:

#### a) Microbes – natural bacteria consume ocean oil – that’s Berwyn – prefer – cites recent studies and scientific experts.

#### b) Empirics – BP spill proves either long brink or low probability of catastrophic extinctions.

#### c) Framing – invisible threshold args are stupid – lack of specificity means you prioritize DAs on timeframe and probability.

#### More warrants:

#### 1) Ixtoc spill – currents, cleanup, and ultraviolet light breakdown, and hurricanes check

Garvin 10 (Glenn, reporter and staff writer for the Miami Herald, internally cites Wes Tunnell, associate director of the Harte Research Institute, PhD in biology from Texas A&M University, MS in biology from Texas A&I University, also cites other prominent marine scientists, McClatchy Newspapers, June 12, 2010, last updated March 15, 2013, “Ixtoc: The Gulf's other massive oil spill no longer apparent,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/12/v-print/95793/ixtoc-the-gulfs-other-massive.html>, alp)

The oil was everywhere, long black sheets of it, 15 inches thick in some places. Even if you stepped in what looked like a clean patch of sand, it quickly and gooily puddled around your feet. And Wes Tunnell, as he surveyed the mess, had only one bleak thought: "Oh, my God, this is horrible! It's all gonna die!'' But it didn't. Thirty-one years since the worst oil spill in North American history blanketed 150 miles of Texas beach, tourists noisily splash in the surf and turtles drag themselves into the dunes to lay eggs. "You look around and it's like the spill never happened,'' shrugs Tunnell, a marine biologist. "There's a lot of perplexity in it for many of us. For Tunnell and others involved in the fight to contain the June 3, 1979, spill from Mexico's Ixtoc 1 offshore well in the Gulf of Campeche, the BP blowout in the Gulf of Mexico conjures an eerie sense of deja vu. Like the BP spill, the Ixtoc disaster began with a burst of gas followed by an explosion and fire, followed by a relentless gush of oil that resisted all attempts to block it. Plugs of mud and debris, chemical dispersants, booms skimming the surface of the water: Mexico's Pemex oil company tried them all, but still the spill inexorably crept ashore, first in southeast Mexico, later in Texas. But if the BP spill seems to be repeating one truth already demonstrated in the Ixtoc spill ... that human technology is no match for a high-pressure undersea oil blowout ... scientists are hoping that it may eventually confirm another: that the environment has a stunning capacity to heal itself from manmade insults. "The environment is amazingly resilient, more so than most people understand,'' says Luis A. Soto, a deep-sea biologist with advanced degrees from Florida State University and the University of Miami who teaches at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. "To be honest, considering the magnitude of the spill, we thought the Ixtoc spill was going to have catastrophic effects for decades ...But within a couple of years, almost everything was close to 100 percent normal again.'' That kind of optimism was unthinkable at the time of the spill, which took nearly 10 months to cap. The 30,000 barrels of oil a day it spewed into the ocean obliterated practically every living thing in its path. As it washed ashore, in some zones marine life was reduced by 50 percent; in others, 80 percent. The female population of an already-endangered species of sea turtles known as Kemp's Ridley shrank to 300, perilously close to extinction. What survived wasn't much better off. Soto, surveying fish and shrimp in the Mexican coastal waters near the spill, found them infested with tumors. The sizable fishing industry in the area was practically shut down ... not that the boats were able to make their way through the massive clumps of giant tar balls bobbing through the Gulf of Campeche anyway. "There were a lot of those balls of oil at that time, and they could really mess up the machinery of your engines,'' recalls 62-year-old Isidro Vega Morales, who operates three fishing boats in Ciudad del Carmen, a Mexican port about 60 miles southeast of the Ixtoc oil well. "There were so many balls, and so few fish, that after a while some of the fishermen started catching the balls instead. They'd melt the tar down into oil and sell it as a kind of sealant for other small fishing boats.'' In Texas, meanwhile, tourism curdled. Oil was so unavoidable on the popular beaches of Padre Island, just south of Corpus Christi, that hotels installed special mats outside along with signs pleading with guests to clean their feet rather than track tar into their rooms. And scientists feared a less visible but more insidious effect of the spill: that it had killed off small organisms living at the tide line that form a crucial part of the marine food chain. "These are things that most people never notice, some small segmented worms called amphipods, some little shrimp-like crustaceans,'' says Tunnell, associate director of the Harte Research Institute at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi. "They were practically wiped out. And if they didn't recover, it would have drastically affected the food chain, from small fish and crabs up to shorebirds and beyond.'' But after three months in which nothing went right, Texas had some good luck ... or, to put it in a glass-half-empty way, Alabama and Mississippi had some bad luck. Hurricane Frederic, while plowing into those two states, sent tides of two-foot waves reeling into the Texas shoreline. Overnight, half the 3,900 tons of oil piled up on Texan beaches disappeared. And human clean-up efforts began putting a dent in the rest. Even in Mexico, which had neither the resources nor the hurricanes of the United States, the oil began disappearing under a ferocious counterattack by nature. In the water, much of it evaporated; on beaches, the combined forces of pounding waves, ultraviolet light and petroleum-eating microbes broke it down. "The environment in the Gulf of Mexico is used to coping with petroleum,'' says Tunnell. " The seabed is crisscrossed with petroleum reservoirs, and the equivalent of one to two supertankers full of oil leaks into the Gulf every year. The outcome of that is a huge population of bacteria that feed on oil and live along the shoreline.'' The bacteria as well as other marine life forms along the shoreline got a boost from a strategy employed by both the United States and Mexico: to more or less give up on stopping the oil spill from reaching beaches while concentrating on keeping it out of estuaries and wetlands. "Texas just made a superhuman effort to keep the oil away from rivers, with two or three or four layers of booms to skim it away,'' said Thomas C. Shirley, a biodiversity specialist at Texas A&M Corpus Christi. "We know how to clean up beaches, and it's simple. It's just sand." "But you get up into wetlands, where you're cleaning up shrubs and sea grasses, and it's far more difficult. Everything you're cleaning is alive, and you have to be careful not to do more harm than good.'' By keeping oil out of rivers and lagoons, authorities ensured a steady stream of nutrients back into the coastal areas. And as the spill diminished, marine life had a baby boom. "A lot of the fishermen around here will tell you that the fish never came back,'' says Vega Morales. " They'll say, 'Oh, in the old days, you could catch fish with your hat, it was so easy.' That's how we are, always talking about the one that got away. But the truth is, after maybe nine months or so, it was back to normal.'' Soto, who followed the fish and shrimp population off Mexico closely, found to his surprise that for most species the numbers had returned to normal within two years. "The catastrophic effects that everybody's looking for, those are mostly limited to the first months,'' he says. "Then you start looking in subsequent months, the long- range view, and it all diminishes. The pollution effect becomes more and more difficult to find ...It's like a radio signal, when you're close, it's strong. But when you start moving away, the signal starts to fade.''

#### 2) Fish – farm closure boosts population numbers – federal farms are an alt cause

Raines 10 (Ben, former environment reporter for the Alabama Media Group, internally cites scientists including Dr. John Valentine, a senior marine scientists and associate professor at the Dauphin Island Sea Lab and University of South Alabama, All Alabama, November 7, 2010, “Researcher: Fish numbers triple after oil spill fishing closures,” <http://blog.al.com/live/2010/11/researcher_fish_numbers_triple.html>, alp)

GULF OF MEXICO -- Scientists are starting to believe the most powerful environmental effect stemming from the BP oil spill may have nothing to do with the millions of gallons of petroleum loosed in the Gulf of Mexico. Instead, ongoing research suggests the federal closure of the richest portion of the Gulf to all fishing through the spring and summer months resulted in dramatic increases in the abundance of numerous marine creatures, from shrimp to sharks. Scientists said the forced closure illustrates the profound influence fishing pressure has on the marine world, though a federal fisheries regulator said many other factors might be at play. In the end, a group of Gulf Coast researchers believe the positive impact of the fishing closure will likely make it difficult to detect the full suite of negative effects caused by the oil. “It is possible that the federal management activities had more of an effect on the Gulf than anything BP did with their oil,” said John Valentine, senior marine scientist at the Dauphin Island Sea Lab, discussing data collected before, during and after the spill.

#### 3) Crabs

Clark 13 (Maria, reporter, internally referencing a new study conducted by Tulane University and the University of Louisiana – Lafayette, New Orleans City Business, August 8, 2013, “Study finds blue crab population resilient after Gulf oil spill,” <http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/blog/2013/08/08/study-finds-blue-crab-population-resilient-after-gulf-oil-spill/>, alp)

A study co-published by Tulane University and the University of Louisiana-Lafayette found that the 2010 BP oil spill did not cause any significant damage to blue crab populations in the Gulf of Mexico. Researchers from both institutions began studying blue crabs in the Gulf of Mexico after the oil spill expecting to find an immediate impact to the blue crab population. Their research has shown that there haven’t been any obvious mortality rates. The study is ongoing and funded by the BP/ Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative. Caz Taylor, one of the lead investigators of the study and an assistant professor of ecology and evolutionary biology at Tulane, had already been studying crab movements along the coast for six months before the oil spill. Blue crabs live mostly near shore, but when they spawn, female crabs swim out into the Gulf. When their eggs hatch into larvae, some will reach the shore and develop into adult crabs. Because the spill happened at the height of their spawning cycle, researchers assumed it would have a direct impact on population numbers. Their investigation focused on several sites from Galveston, Texas to Appalachicola. Researchers are now trying to determine why the population appears unaffected by the spill. They are now studying whether the closure of certain fishing sites in the Gulf after the spill gave the population enough time to proliferate or whether crab larvae could have drifted in from other areas of the Gulf.

# 1NR

### China

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:50)

#### The DA outweighs and turns the case:

#### 1) Chinese econ – the aff causes anti-Chinese sentiment – that collapses Chinese export markets and prevents them from achieving growth targets – that causes instability, repression, and migration – escalates to global collapse, loose nukes, and lashout.

#### 2) Framing – outweighs on magnitude – triggers global escalation and retaliation – prefer it – you can only die once and Chinese instability makes every global problem worse – tanks relations – solves and turns every impact in the 1AC

Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly different histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

China bigger il to econ

#### Turns warming and the environment

Mingde 12 [Zhang Mingde, professor of diplomatic policy at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in ChinaMuch in Common, Americas Quarterly: Winter 2012: Volume 0: Issue 0, http://www.ciaonet.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/aq/aq1054/05.html // Accessed: July 11th 2013]

China and Latin America may be distant geographically, but they share a long history of friendship and common challenges. Both are at similar stages of development, and both seek more development. As our economies grow closer, we are pursuing even greater opportunities for mutual understanding and closer cooperation. The Chinese government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean strategically, and from this perspective it is seeking to build a comprehensive and cooperative partnership of equality, mutual benefit and common development. The past decade has witnessed dramatic progress in China-Latin America relations. What began as primarily a trade relationship-in which two-way trade has grown exponentially-has developed into a multifaceted relationship. Exchanges of high-level visitors occur regularly. China has established strategic partnerships with Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela. Communication between China and Latin America has expanded dialogue and exchanges at all levels of government. New channels have opened for people-to-people exchanges. And many countries now collaborate in multilateral institutions and forums. China and Latin America share common or similar positions on many issues. China and the emerging powers in Latin America now consult, coordinate and collaborate well in many formal and informal multilateral forums like the grouping of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries, the G20, the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, and the UN Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development. These pragmatic trade and economic relationships have not only consolidated political relations; they have brought tangible benefit to the well-being of both peoples.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:40)

#### Aff crowds out China:

#### 1) New hemispheric tone – causes bandwagoning to the US which disrupts Chinese trade blocs and creates an uncertain investment environment.

#### 2) Perception – shared history and culture mean countries will switch sides if we show interest – proximity supercharges the link

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### 3) Empirics – Columbia pushed China out after we funded their war on FARC – affecting ideology is key – spills over to regional market access

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

### It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population

### 2NC – Link (generic zero-sum)

#### Relations are zero-sum:

#### 1) Financing locus – US proximity means we step in

Menendez 13 (Fernando Menéndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, “The Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, web)

From the perspective of Latin America’s foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons – China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development. China’s foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise China’s cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from America’s national security apparatus.

#### 2) US decline proves

Mallen 13(<http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981> Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US? By Patricia Rey Mallén on June 28 2013 nkj)

As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global superpower, China is gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on America’s list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void,” Cerna said. Related Will Nicaragua’s New Canal Overshadow Panama’s? A Tale Of Two Trips: Latin America Reacts To Xi and Biden's Visits Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008. Notably, though, America’s trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil. Concomitant with this burgeoning interest from the Far East, Latin America is undergoing an economic rebirth. After decades of devastating economic crises, the region is experiencing unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin American countries will be 3.7 percent this year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest of the world. That has prompted several countries to form quasi-governmental entities to further promote the progress of the region. One such entity is the recently formed Pacific Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which together represent half of the region’s total exports and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting in Colombian capital Bogotá last month, the Pacific Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to Asian markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend. Though a recent trip to the region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, China’s President Xi Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders, illustrating how the two global powers are going after the same prize. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (c.) visited the Santa Marta slum in Rio de Janeiro in May. REUTERS/Victor R. Caivano/Pool Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip coinciding with the beginning of Xi’s in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin American presidents and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xi’s trip was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobago’s main newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a “historic occasion” and a “visit from China to a good friend.” Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does not recognize the island as a nation. Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico. President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. China's President Xi Jinping (l.) and first lady Peng Liyuan walk together during a visit at the archaeological site of Chichen Itza in the peninsula of Yucatan June 6, 2013. Xi and his wife were on a three-day official visit to Mexico. REUTERS/Victor Ruiz Garcia Biden’s visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America “Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development in China’s investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese company to build a canal through the country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region -- and even the world. If built, the canal could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now part of Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the nation's historical dominance in the region. That dominance is in decline. After decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin American leaders have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chávez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free man," no matter what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail." The SS Kroonland transits the newly opened Panama Canal on Feb. 2, 1915, via the Culebra Cut. The canal has long symbolized U.S. dominance in the region. Underwood & Underwood (public domain) Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international relations at Boston University, says China speaks to the region’s newfound confidence. “China is offering attractive deals to Latin American economies while the United States continues to lecture and dictate,” Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. “For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs,” he added. “Compare that to China’s approach: It offers Latin America what it wants.” Gallagher argued that the U.S.’ biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its conditions. China, on the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003, with no previous conditions and very few strings attached. “Latin America is very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank,” Gallagher said. “China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities.” Gallagher said the U.S. should awake from its past slumber and stop taking Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and America continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's cultural and historical ties to the region, Ben-Ami said. “Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos’ influence in the U.S., it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China,” he said. Still, Gallagher and Ben-Ami agree that the U.S. needs to step up, both economically and diplomatically, to compete with new influences in a part of the world that was until recently widely considered America’s domain. “Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure U.S. influence -- in Latin America or anywhere else,” Ben-Ami said. “It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America,” Gallagher observed. “Very soon, it might be too late.”

#### 3) Resources and markets prove – influence is key

Regenstreif 13(The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America By Gary Regenstreif JUNE 12, 2013 <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/> nkj)

Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China — which has money to burn in the region. “There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. “There’s something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.” The United States, Latin America’s largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position. Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the hemisphere’s nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin America — more than three times the region’s commerce with China. In Obama’s first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast. China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the region’s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil’s foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties. Washington’s renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs. “It’s about influence and leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, “…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past.”

#### Oil trade is uniquely zero-sum

Luft 2006 (Gal, PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security “Challenge or Opportunity? China’s Role in Latin America”, United States Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm>)

China's pursuit of Latin American oil will only make matters worse. EEvery barrel of oil China buys in the Americas means one less barrel of Western hemispheric oil available to the United States market. This means that China will have to--the United States will have to look for this oil elsewhere, and that will be particularly in the Middle East, which is contrary to President Bush's pledge to make the United States less dependent on, ``places that don't particularly like us.'' So when it comes to oil, Mr. Chairman, this is a zero-sum game.

### 2NC – Link (perception)

#### Link’s perception based:

#### 1) Gravitational effect toward trade powers

Kreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. “No Strings Attached? Evaluating China’s Trade Relations Abroad.” The Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/> EW

To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional**,** however,this “gravitational effect” has a sound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudan’s trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with China’s foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of “new colonialism” as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in which China’s trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which China’s growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

#### 2) Trade blocs prove

**Valencia 6/24** (Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the United States, or will it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be treated as an equal player.

As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation.

China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, China’s largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.

China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as “El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

#### 3) Soft balancing

Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School (Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, “China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE

Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing – and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical – Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While Latin American governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention on the part of the United States and the latter’s rather narrowly defined national security interests in its relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the United States by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to balance against the United States? China is an increasingly important factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries “embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy”. Multidirectional is the key word here. All Latin American governments have diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008–09, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers. This applies to Latin America as much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The result of opportunity-maximising in Asia–Latin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeply institutionalised) trans- Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of American States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

#### Framing issue – no uniqueness for the impact turn – China controls Latin America now and US influence is declining – proves either no impact to heg decline or no brink.

#### PRC wont be provocative

Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)>

In general, as this section has suggested, the course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in the medium or long term is likely to differ significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establish- ment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.

**No impact to territorial disputes**

**Rousseau 4/3**—Ph.D. is a professor of international relations at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku. Read more articles by Richard Rousseau (Richard, “The New Japanese Defense Strategy: A New Role for Japan?”, April 3, 2011, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/03/the-new-japanese-defense-strategy-a-new-role-for-japan/0/>, ZBurdette)

Second, there is the territorial dispute over a group of islands called Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by the Chinese. Located in the eastern China Sea, they are currently controlled by Japan but sovereignty over them is also claimed by Beijing (and Taiwan). Although, as stressed by Richard Koo, chief economist at the Nomura Research Institute in Tokyo, control of this group of islands is not particularly relevant from a purely strategic point of view, their sovereignty is an issue of great symbolic, economic, political and historical importance. Since 1968, when oil prospectors found evidence of probable oil and gas deposits off the islands, periodic incidents there have caused some tense moments. These incidents did not degenerated into open conflicts thanks to the **will of both parties not to unnecessarily stir up a violent military escalation**. The last skirmish occurred in September 2010, when after a collision between a Chinese fishing vessel and a reconnaissance ship from the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) the Chinese boat captain was arrested and detained for more than two weeks, causing the most serious diplomatic incident between Tokyo and Beijing in recent years and unleashing harsh official protests from Beijing, with serious threats of economic and political reprisals. This episode was the last of the red flags which has contributed to an increase in Tokyo’s perception that China is demonstrating a growing assertiveness.

**Economic ties check**

**Rousseau 4/3**—Ph.D. is a professor of international relations at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku. Read more articles by Richard Rousseau (Richard, “The New Japanese Defense Strategy: A New Role for Japan?”, April 3, 2011, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/03/the-new-japanese-defense-strategy-a-new-role-for-japan/0/>, ZBurdette)

Finally, it must be remembered that an increasing role is being given to the Japan Coast Guard, the protagonist in the last September incident and a paramilitary force whose functions of monitoring and controlling the south-eastern seas have grown in recent years. It has many vehicles at its disposal and it acts almost as a second naval force.

More generally, it is noted in several parts of the Guidelines that there is a need to strengthen the Japanese military projection capability in south-west Asia and to change the structure of Japan’s Cold War era Armed Forces. The latter have to respond with more incisiveness to the challenges of the combustible region of East Asia, where the rise of China represents, at least in the eyes of Japanese strategists, the most serious threat in the long run. This, along with other major causes of regional instability such as the issues of North Korea and Taiwan and the uncertain role of U.S. leadership in the near future, has helped to nurture a sense that Japan is being encircled and has made Tokyo aware of the need to reconsider its international posture and defensive strategy.

In the final analysis, however, the Guidelines are a mostly symbolic step to boosting Japan’s security and defense. The deterrence effect of the new NDPG may be minimal. The announcement made by Naoto Kan on January 6, 2011 that he wants to set up a committee of experts to mend relations with China shows that if the two East Asian most powerful states manage to contain their excesses of nationalism and territorial aspiration, the high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries will make open Sino-Japanese military confrontation very unlikely, at least in the mid-term.

### shun

### 2NC Overview

**Plan’s coercive—that’s Younkins**

**A) Taxation—Government taxation used to fund the plan is the equivalent of theft—prevents individuals from having freedom with their earnings**

**B) Turns case—The government will perform the plan poorly—it will be mired with bureaucratic failures because they have no incentive to make their programs work since it’s not their money—[this is a conceded argument, no new 1ar answers, destroys debates academic integrity, makes neg strategy impossible]—private actors solve the case**

### 2NC Ethics—Short

**Ethics outweighs**

**A) Can’t predict the future and util causes the worst atrocities**

**Anderson 4** (Kerby, is National Director of Probe Ministries International. He holds masters degrees from Yale University (science) and from Georgetown University (government). “Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number” <http://www.probe.org/site/apps/nlnet/content.aspx?c=fdKEIMNsEoG&b=4282487&ct=5517599> //Donnie)

There are also a number of problems with utilitarianism. One problem with utilitarianism is that it leads to an "end justifies the means" mentality. If any worthwhile end can justify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that the end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. A particular act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some objective and consistent standard of morality. Second, utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans. Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on results, then we would have to have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results. Utilitarianism provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself.

**B) No value to life under coercion**

**Raz 86** (Joseph, Philosopher, *The Morality of Freedom*, page 307)

One way to test the thesis of the primacy of action reasons is to think of a person who is entirely passive and is continuously led, cleaned, and pumped full with hash, so that he is perpetually content, and wants nothing but to stay in the same condition. It’s a familiar imaginary horror. How do we rank the success of such a life? It is not the worst life one can have. It is simply not a life at all. It lacks activity, it lacks goals. To the extent that one is tempted to judge it more harshly than that and to regard it as a ‘negative life’ this is because of the wasted potentiality. It is a life which could have been and was not. We can isolate this feature by imagining that the human being concerned is mentally and physically effected in a way which rules out the possibility of a life with any kind of meaningful pursuit in it. Now it is just not really a life at all. This does not preclude one from saying that it is better than human life. It is simply sufficiently unlike human life in the respects that matter that we regard it as only a degenerate case of human life. But clearly not being alive can be better than that life.

**C) This is a debate round—we don’t have control over levers of power—their inherency and 1ac impacts prove that extinction is inevitable since the plan won’t be done—we should use this form to learn to be ethical**

**D) The government can’t manage problems—their ideology culminates in extinction**

**Rockwell** **3** (Llewellyn H. Jr., president of the Mises Institute, The Free Market, The Mises Institute Monthly, “The Hayek Moment,” May 2003, vol. 21, no.5, www.mises.org/freemarket\_detail.asp?control=439&sortorder=articledate, JMP) \*\*\*note: gender modified

The relevance of Hayek in our times extends beyond just business cycle analysis. In later years, Hayek turned his attention to other matters concerning the methods of science (he decried the "pretense of knowledge" affected by social scientists) and the uses of power in society. His Road to Serfdom warned that the regimentation of totalitarian societies can only come to Britain and the US through central planning. What is at stake, he wrote, is not just productive economies but freedom itself. In our time, that freedom is threatened by intervention in every aspect of economic life but also through the use of military power. Government not only claims it is smart enough to manage the economy, fix up our communities, run our schools, but also to decide which foreign politicians deserve to be protected and which deserve to be destroyed. The implicit assumption is always that government knows more and better than the rest of us, and that this knowledge is sufficient to give it rights the rest of us do not have. It is often said that knowledge is power. In the case of government, however, its power **vastly exceeds** its knowledge. When Alan Greenspan of the Fed (a branch of government in every important respect) testifies before Congress, legislators listen attentively to find out what he knows about the state of the economy, as if he has some privileged access to high-level data not reported elsewhere. It is further assumed that he knows precisely how to act on it. It is this knowledge that allows him to operate the gears and levers of the economy, so it is believed. The same assumptions are made about many aspects of government. Many people who have backed war with Iraq assume that the government must know something awful about Saddam that it cannot share with the general public. It's true, they admit, that Saddam does not have nuclear weapons and that there is not public information that suggests he is plotting the destruction of America as we know it. But surely the White House must know something we do not, and know what to do about it, else why would the administration be so intent on removing him from power? The belief that powerful people know more than the rest of us is a **main source** of their power. It's true only to this extent: powerful people are likely to know when they are telling the truth and when they are not. The rest of us are put in a position of having to guess or dig to verify their claims point by point. Experience teaches that politicians often lie. But there's an even more important point: because government activity takes place outside the framework of the market economy, government **has no idea** how to use the information it does have to achieve social good. Think of all the bits of information the government had been collecting to assess the likelihood of a terrorist incident. A few warnings among tens of thousands of tips did not suffice to prevent this destructive attack. The accumulation of information has grown steadily more voluminous. The government is in no better position to make judgments about it today than it was two years ago. In contrast, insurance companies are in the business of assessing risk all the time, and they do this by means of a system of profit and loss, which Mises demonstrated is essential to a rationally organized society. Government, on the other hand, just collects piles of data and is completely at a loss on how to assess the relative likelihood of any particular scenario, or what to do about it. Remember this winter's now-famous announcement that Americans should stock up on duct tape to protect themselves from chemical warfare. People rushed to the stores and cleaned out the shelves. Later it turned out that duct taping windows can be very dangerous and even cause asphyxiation. Not only that: the tip concerning the coming bio-terrorism was a hoax. The "high alert"—as if that means anything to regular people—that government told Americans to be on was not justified. In contrast, the private sector enhances security through peaceful and normal means. Home insurance companies give premium breaks for people who install alarm systems. Health insurers charge more for people who live dangerously. Premiums go up when risk is high and they fall when it is low. Through this mechanism, people are encouraged to adopt safe ways of living or pay the difference if they choose not to. Those who contract to provide security face competition and have the incentive and means to provide what they promise. What a contrast to the chaotic and fumbling ways of government security provision! But failure does not deter the state. Indeed, we are now asked to believe that the White House is not only omnipotent but omniscient as well. These people in government presume to make definitive judgments about the entire Iraqi ruling class, even going so far as to say that they know the secret hostility of a huge range of people toward Saddam, which thus qualifies them (who just happen to have essential technical knowledge) to help in administering the country. They can't possibly know this. That they believe they can, or they believe we will believe their claims to know, is incredible and frightening. The alarming reality brings to mind Hayek's Nobel Prize lecture in 1974. With great courage, Hayek spoke of the tendency of economists to presume that they know things about human behavior that they do not and cannot know. They do this because they try to apply the models of the physical sciences to explain human action, always with an aim toward controlling the outcomes of human choice. In truth, human action is too complex and subjective to be accessed by social scientists, and the attempt will always lead to abysmal failure. Hayek went on to explain how his critique of positivist economic modeling applies more broadly to anyone who would attempt to imitate the form while missing the substance of scientific procedure. "But it is by no means only in the field of economics that far-reaching claims are made on behalf of a more scientific direction of all human activities and the desirability of replacing spontaneous processes by 'conscious human control'." He mentions that the point applies to sociology, psychiatry, and the philosophy of history. Hayek was raising an objection not to the idea of omniscience but of the possibility of accessing even mundane knowledge. No small group in government, much less a single person, can accumulate and sort through the kinds of information **necessary to administer society**, much less destroy and reconstruct one, as the Bush administration proposes to do throughout the Gulf region and the Middle East. The attempt to assemble such a list is an act of power, not intelligence. We are being asked to make an enormous leap of faith that the Bush administration has somehow solved the great problem that afflicts us all: the limits of human comprehension. Because of those limits, we are right to try to limit the ability of men to exercise power over their fellows, at home or abroad. Thus does Hayek's point apply to politics, especially to politics, even more especially to the politics of the military machine. The social scientist who believes he has the master plan to run the world is enough of a menace. But the politician who believes this, and is contemplating war, can bring about massive **amounts of destruction and death**. In these **nuclear days**—and let us say what we don't like to contemplate but which is nonetheless true—[they] he can bring about the **end of the world** as we know it. As Hayek notes, a tyrant who carries the pretense of knowledge too far can become **"a destroyer of civilization."** "If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order," said Hayek, "he will have to learn that . . . he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make mastery of the events possible." To believe otherwise is foolhardy and dangerous. "The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society."

**E) State cooption turns case**

**Browne 95** – former Libertarian Party candidate and Director of Public Policy, American Liberty Foundation (Harry, Why Government Doesn’t Work, p 19-20, AG)

To get it enacted you’ll need political allies, since alone you have only limited influence. But other people will support your plan and work for it only if you modify it in dozens of ways that further their goals and satisfy their opinions. Suppose you make the necessary compromises and amass enough support to pressure the politicians to vote for your revised program. Who will write the actual law? You? Of course not. It will be written by the same legislators and aides who created all the laws, programs, and problems you object to now. Each of them will compromise your program still further to satisfy his political supporters. And if the law passes, who will administer it? You? Of course not. It will be implemented by bureaucrats — many of whom will use it to pursue goals quite different from what you had in mind. They won’t care what your purpose was. It’s their law now, and they’ll use it to suit their objectives. And, lastly, the new law probably will generate many disputes — cases that must be settled in a courtroom. Who will decide those cases? You? Of course not. It will be the same judges who today rule according to their own beliefs, rather than by reference to the written law. A judge may even rule that your law means exactly the opposite of what you had intended. By the time your program has run this gauntlet, it will be far bigger and far more expensive (in money and disrupted lives) than you had imagined. And it will have been twisted to satisfy many factions. In fact, **your program may end up** being **the opposite of what you** had **intended.**

**F) Extinction is justified even if it risks future generations**

**Shue, 89** – Professor of Ethics and Public Life at Princeton University (Henry, 1989, Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Google Books, p. 64-65)

The issue raises interesting problems about obligations among generations. What obligations do we owe to future generations whose very existence will be affected by our risks? A crude utilitarian calculation would suggest that since the pleasures of future generations may last infi­nitely (or until the sun burns out), no risk that we take to assure certain values for our generation can compare with almost infinite value in the future. Thus we have no right to take such risks. In effect, such an approach would establish a dictatorship of future generations over the present one. The only permissible role for our genera­tion would be biological procreation. If we care about other values in addition to survival, this crude utilitarian approach produces intolerable consequences for the current generation. Moreover, utility is too crude a concept to support such a calculation. We have little idea of what utility will mean to generations very distant from ours. We think we know something about our children, and perhaps our grandchil­dren, but what will people value 8,000 years from now? If we do not know, then there is the ironic prospect that something we deny ourselves now for the sake of a future generation may be of little value to them. A more defensible approach to the issue of justice among generations is the principle of equal access. Each generation should have roughly equal access to important values. We must admit that we shall not be certain of the detailed prefer­ences of increasingly distant generations, but we can as­sume that they will wish equal chances of survival. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that they would want survival as a sole value any more than the current generation does. On the contrary, if they would wish equal access to other values that give meaning to life, we could infer that they might wish us to take some risks of species extinction in order to provide them equal access to those values. If we have benefited from "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," why should we as­sume that the next generation would want only life?

### 2NC Ethics—Extra

**G) Intervening actors check their impacts**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

We may note, first, that many of the key concepts and ideas are quite new, including the very notion of existential risk. Without the requisite concepts in place, momentum for efforts to understand and mitigate existential risk could not build; and this may help explain the primitive state of the art. In many instances, the underlying science and the methodological tools for studying existential risks in a meaningful way have also only recently become available. It is arguably only since the detonation of the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, and the subsequent nuclear buildup during the Cold War, that any significant naturalistic (i.e., non‐supernatural) existential risks have arisen—at least if we count only risks over which human beings have some influence.35 The most significant existential risks still seem to lie many years into the future. Until recently, therefore, there may have been relatively little need to think about existential risk in general and few opportunities for mitigation even if such thinking had taken place. Public awareness of the global impacts of human activities appears to be increasing. Systems, processes, and risks are studied today from a global perspective by many scholars, including environmental scientists, economists, epidemiologists, and demographers. Problems such as climate change, cross‐border terrorism, and international financial crises help to direct attention to global interdependency and threats to the global system. The idea of risk in general seems to have risen in prominence.36 Given these advances in knowledge, methods, and attitudes, the conditions for securing for existential risks the scientific scrutiny they deserve are unprecedentedly propitious. Opportunities for action may also increase. As noted, some mitigation projects can be undertaken unilaterally, and one may expect more such projects as the world becomes richer. Other mitigation projects require wider coordination—in many cases, global coordination. Here, too, some trend lines seem to show this becoming more feasible over time. There is a long‐term historic trend toward increasing the scope of political integration—from hunter‐gatherer bands to chiefdoms, city states, nation states, and now multinational organizations, regional alliances, various international governance structures, and other aspects of globalization.(56) Extrapolation of this trend would point to the creation of a singleton.(57) It is also possible that some of the global movements that have been emerging over the last half century—in particular, the peace movement, the environmentalist movement, and various global justice and human‐rights movements—will gradually take on board more generalized concerns about existential risk.37 Furthermore, to the extent that existential‐risk mitigation really is a most deserving cause, one may expect that general improvements in society’s ability to recognize and act on important truths will differentially funnel resources into existential‐risk mitigation. General improvements of this kind might arise from advances in educational techniques, institutional innovations (e.g., prediction markets), advances in science and philosophy, spread of rationality culture, biological cognitive enhancement, and many other sources. Finally, it is possible that the cause will at some point receive a boost from the occurrence of a major (nonexistential) catastrophe that underscores the precariousness of the present human condition. That would, needless to say, be the worst possible way for our minds to be concentrated—yet one which, in a multidecadal time frame, must be accorded a non‐negligible probability of occurrence.38

**H) We control empirics—cause-and-effect claims require a coherent theory of human behavior – their advantages are epistemologically unacceptable and make unending violence inevitable**

**Rockwell** Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/200**8** (Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” <http://mises.org/story/2982>)

Not even an event as spectacular as the spontaneous meltdown of a superpower and all its client states was enough to impart the message of economic freedom. And the truth is that it was not necessary. The whole of our world is covered with lessons about the merit of economic liberty over central planning. Our everyday lives are dominated by the glorious products of the market, which we all gladly take for granted. We can open up our web browsers and tour an electronic civilization that the market created, and note that government never did anything useful at all by comparison. We are also inundated daily by the failures of the state. We complain constantly that the educational system is broken, that the medical sector is oddly distorted, that the post office is unaccountable, that the police abuse their power, that the politicians have lied to us, that **tax dollars are stolen**, that whatever bureaucracy we have to deal with is inhumanly unresponsive. We note all this. But far fewer are somehow able to **connect the dots** and see the myriad ways in which daily life confirms that the market radicals like Mises, Hayek, Hazlitt, and Rothbard were correct in their judgments. What's more, this is not a new phenomenon that we can observe in our lifetimes only. We can look at any country in any period and note that every bit of wealth ever created in the history of mankind has been generated through some kind of market activity, and never by governments. Free people create; states destroy. It was true in the ancient world. It was true in the first millennium after Christ. It was true in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. And with the birth of complex structures of production and the increasing division of labor in those years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle. The world's population soared. We saw the creation of the middle class. We saw the poor improve their plight and change their own class identification. **The empirical truth has never been hard to come by**. **What matters are the theoretical eyes that see**. This is what dictates the lesson we draw from events. Marx and Bastiat were writing at the same time. The former said capitalism was creating a calamity and that abolition of ownership was the solution. Bastiat saw that statism was creating a calamity and that the abolition of state plunder was the solution. What was the difference between them? They saw the same facts, but they saw them in very different ways. They had a different perception of cause and effect. I suggest to you that there is an important lesson here as regards **the methodology of the social sciences**, as well as an agenda and strategy for the future. Concerning method, we need to recognize that Mises was precisely right concerning the relationship between facts and economic truth. If we have a solid theory in mind, the facts on the ground provide excellent illustrative material. They inform us about the application of theory in the world in which we live. They provided excellent anecdotes and revealing stories of how economic theory is confirmed in practice. **But absent that theory of economics**, **facts alone are nothing but facts**. **They do not convey any information about cause and effect**, and they do not point a way forward. Think of it this way. Let's say you have a bag of marbles that is turned upside down on the ground. Ask two people their impressions. The first one understands what numbers mean, what shapes mean, and what colors mean. This person can give a detailed account of what he sees: how many marbles, what kinds, how big they are, and this person can explain what he sees in different ways potentially for hours. But now consider the second person, who, we can suppose, has absolutely no understanding of numbers, not even that they exist as abstract ideas. This person has no comprehension of either shape or color. He sees the same scene as the other person but cannot provide anything like an explanation of any patterns. He has very little to say. All he sees is a series of random objects. Both these people see the same facts. But they understand them in very different ways, owing to the abstract notions of meaning that they carry in their minds. This is why positivism as pure science, a method of assembling a potentially infinite series of data points, is a fruitless undertaking. Data points on their own convey no theory, suggest no conclusions, and offer no truths. To arrive at truth requires the most important step that we as human beings can ever take: thinking. Through this thinking, and with good teaching and reading, we can put together a coherent theoretical apparatus that helps us understand. Now, we have a hard time conjuring up in our minds the likes of a man [person] who has no comprehension of numbers, colors, or shapes. And yet I suggest to you that this is precisely what we are facing when we encounter a person who has never thought about economic theory and never studied the implications of the science at all. The facts of the world look quite random to this person. He sees two societies next to each other, one free and prosperous and the other unfree and poor. He looks at this and concludes nothing important about economic systems because he has never thought hard about the relationship between economic systems and prosperity and freedom. He merely accepts the existence of wealth in one place and poverty in the other as a given, the same way the socialists at a lunch table assumed that the luxurious surroundings and food just happened to be there. Perhaps they will reach for an explanation of some sort, but **absent economic education**, it is not likely to be the correct one. Equally as dangerous as having no theory is having a bad theory that is assembled not by means of logic but by an incorrect view of cause and effect. This is the case with notions such as the Phillips Curve, which posits a tradeoff relationship between inflation and unemployment. The idea is that you can drive unemployment down very low if you are willing to tolerate high inflation; or it can work the other way around: you can stabilize prices provided you are willing to put up with high unemployment. Now, of course this makes no sense on the microeconomic level. When inflation is soaring, businesses don't suddenly say, hey, let's hire a bunch of new people! Nor do they say, you know, the prices we pay for inventory have not gone up or have fallen. Let's fire some workers! This much is true about macroeconomics: It is commonly treated like a subject completely devoid of any connection to microeconomics or even human decision making. It is as if we enter into a video game featuring fearsome creatures called Aggregates that battle it out to the death. So you have one creature called Unemployment, one called Inflation, one called Capital, one called Labor, and so on until you can construct a fun game that is sheer fantasy. Another example of this came to me just the other day. A recent study claimed that labor unions increase the productivity of firms. How did the researchers discern this? They found that unionized companies tend to be larger with more overall output than nonunionized companies. Well, let's think about this. Is it likely that if you close a labor pool to all competition, give that restrictive labor pool the right to use violence to enforce its cartel, permit that cartel to extract higher-than-market wages from the company and set its own terms concerning work rules and vacations and benefits — is it likely that this will be good for the company in the long run? You have to take leave of your senses to believe this. In fact, what we have here is a simple mix-up of cause and effect. Bigger companies tend to be more likely to attract a kind of unpreventable unionization than smaller ones. The unions target them, with federal aid. It is no more or less complicated than that. It is for the same reason that developed economies have larger welfare states. The parasites prefer bigger hosts; that's all. We would be making a big mistake to assume that the welfare state causes the developed economy. That would be as much a fallacy as to believe that wearing $2,000 suits causes people to become rich. I'm convinced that Mises was right: the most important step economists or economic institutions can take is in the direction of public education in economic logic. There is another important factor here. **The state thrives on an economically ignorant public**. This is the only way it can get away with blaming inflation or recession on consumers, or claiming that the government's fiscal problems are due to our paying too little in taxes. It is economic ignorance that permits the regulatory agencies to claim that they are protecting us as versus denying us choice. It is only by keeping us all in the dark that it can continue to **start war after war** — **violating rights abroad and smashing liberties at home** — in the name of spreading freedom. There is only one force that can put an end to the successes of the state, and that is an economically and morally informed public. Otherwise, the state can continue to spread its malicious and destructive policies.

**I) Their evidence is skewed to create an automatic reliance on government officials and “reliable experts”**

**Davidson 6** (Lawrence, professor of Middle East history at West Chester University of Pennsylvania, Middle East Policy, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” Summer, vol. 13, no. 2, p.134, Proquest, JMP)

CREATING A CLOSED INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The United States takes great pride in its free press. So, we can ask, can that press be relied upon to supply objective information that will allow Americans to see through the trick of presenting special interests as national interests? The answer, most of the time, turns out to be no. As suggested above, our free press with its automatic reliance on government officials and "reliable experts" is also often a skewed press. It must also be kept in mind that the components of the American media are for-profit businesses owned by individuals and corporations supportive of (or at least responsive to) the very interest groups that seek to maintain the privatized status of aspects of American foreign policy.12 And, almost all news outlets have financial reasons not to frighten off advertisers by becoming associated with unpopular positions. Thus, America's mainstream media outlets will usually not give the public all sides of a story. Therefore, unless a citizen takes the trouble to look for a small number of publications known for their skeptical analysis of government policy and special interest influence, or to go to the Web to search out similarly skeptical blogs, or to read foreign news sources, one is condemned to a "closed information environment." However, it is yet another aspect of the provincial nature of the citizenry that most, even when confronted with important events, will feel no need to search for alternative sources of information. Most will feel comfortable with their traditional sources - local newspapers, the betterknown news magazines, radio talk shows, and especially television." A major consequence of this information dependency is that it becomes relatively easy, as Chomsky and Herman put it, to **"manufacture consent"**14 by creating pictures of events and situations that may be biased to favor particular interests. This can be done by consistently presenting and interpreting the news in a certain biased way or by simply leaving out important information judged by editors, owners and financial backers to be undesirable. Nowhere is this practice more evident than in coverage of events in the Middle East. For instance, the recent coverage of Hamas's January 2006 electoral victory in Palestine, the February 2005 Hariri assassination in Lebanon and the ongoing Iranian nuclear debate was skewed in this fashion so as to maintain an interpretation of events generally in line with that of neoconservative and Zionist special interests. The mainstream press, whether conservative or liberal, gave background information that emphasized Hamas's status as a terrorist organization - a fact applauded by pro-Israeli media monitors.15 Unfortunately, that is all the background information that most supplied. The Israeli terror that calls forth the Hamas terror was all but left out of the coverage. The party's pre- and post-election effort to moderate its position on negotiations with Israel was, with rare exceptions, largely ignored. And the contradiction inherent in the U.S. government's presentation of itself as a champion of democracy in the Middle East, while utterly refusing to recognize the Hamas victory in a fair election with a 73 percent turnout, was mostly missing. Likewise, coverage of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon gave readers what one media monitor called "the hole story."16 Using allegations that are yet to be proven, the American press transformed Syria from a state that had maintained stability in Lebanon for 16 years following a prolonged and bloody civil war (a fact rarely mentioned in the press) into an occupying power brutally trespassing on Lebanon's sovereignty. Finally, American reporting on the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions also fails to place the controversy in a balanced context. Largely missing from the reporting and analysis, even that which seeks to downplay the alleged Iranian threat, is the fact that Iran might have good reason to feel the need to bolster its defense. The country was invaded by Iraq in the recent past and has been labeled as part of the "Axis of Evil" by President Bush. The Iranians have no doubt noticed (even if the U.S. press has not) that of the three nations so labeled, the only one not invaded or under threat of attack by the United States is the one with the nuclear arsenal (North Korea). This important part of the context lias not been given play in the United States. By presenting such skewed and incomplete pictures, the mainstream media create a public mindset that some scholars have called "low-information rationality,"17 while others wonder at just what point "low-information rationality becomes noinformation irrationality."18 However you want to characterize it, it is a condition wherein most of the American public cannot understand the real import of the behavior either of alleged adversaries or of their own government. This is, of course, an ideal environment for those lobby groups that wish to have their parochial interests thought of as national interests. It allows the lobbies, in the name of national interest, to encourage the media to demonize those who may stand in the way of their economic or ideological ambitions, or those states (such as Syria and Iran) that are the enemies of their friends (such as Israel). But what happens when there are unexpected results - when millions of foreigners across the globe start criticizing American behavior, when most Arabs scorn the notion that the United States is an "honest broker" promoting a "peace process" between Israelis and Palestinians, when Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez condemn Yankee imperialism to the delight of multitudes? Finally, what happens when someone flies a jetliner into the World Trade Center? When such events take place, Americans - with their **half-baked, slanted news** - have no hope of placing these events within an **accurate historical context.** The resulting bewilderment and resentment, further fed by yet **more manipulated information,** is then a major cost of an otherwise natural indifference to things that lie beyond the next hill.

**J) The world is unpredictable—this means we should default to what is most ethical**

**WARD 1996** (Brian, “The Chaos of History: Notes Towards a Postmodernist Historiography,” Limina, Vol 2, http://www.limina.arts.uwa.edu.au/previous/volumes\_15/volume\_2?f=73934)

Porush establishes the link between narrative-as-history and chaos theory by recognising that before chaos theory, a view of human experience based on the metaphor of the Butterfly Effect was ‘dismissed as pertinent only to the realm of accident, coincidence, kismet, and messy human affairs’.35 Now however, chaos theory suggests that unpredictable or nonlinear events are not only the product of human experience but are also a part of ‘reality’. Stephen H. Kellert contends that historical events can be seen to unfold as the Butterfly Effect suggests because history teems ‘with examples of small events that led to momentous and long-lasting changes in the course of human affairs.’36 Porush and Kellert share this belief with physicists like Marcelo Alonso and Gottfried Mayer-Kress. Alonso states that because ‘social systems are not linear, certain local fluctuations (inventions, discoveries**,** revolutions, wars, [and the] emergence of political leaders etc.) may result in major changes’.37 Mayer-Kress also uses the Butterfly Effect as a historical metaphor to argue that nation states can be described as chaotic systems, and that in such systems small events such as terrorist bombings or minor military deployments can act as catalysts, resulting in all-out nuclear war.38 Chaos theory thus appears to have direct historiographical implications. One consequence of chaos for historiography is that **a linear model of causality can no longer be used to determine the causes and effects of historical events**. A postmodernist historiography demonstrates the ineffectiveness of linear causality, which cannot take into account the inherent discontinuity and indeterminism of historical events. A new historiography that relies on the techniques of literary criticism to achieve its deconstruction of historical narratives is developing. This postmodernist historiography takes nonlinear causality into account, and acknowledges that a single historical text cannot represent the whole of an event.39 Because of this, any piece of information within the text is considered to be significant, and no detail, however irrelevant or unimportant it appears, can be overlooked. A postmodern historiography accepts that detail within the historical text is crucial and tiny details or fragments of information may have great relevance and importance to the event being studied. William V. Spanos calls these details ‘minute particulars’, and argues that knowing the minute particulars of a historical event can make a difference to the analysis of that event.40 Ankersmit argues that the postmodernist historiographer must be ‘capable of linking a small, insignificant detail in one part of the work he investigates to an apparently unrelated detail in another part of that work’ in order to gain information and meaning out of a historical event recorded in a text or a series of texts.41

**K) Util justifies nuclear conflict and all atrocities**

**Holt ’95** Jim Holt, commentator for the BBC, writes frequently about politics and philosophy, August 5, 1995, New York Times, “Morality, Reduced To Arithmetic,” p. Lexis

Can the deliberate massacre of innocent people ever be condoned? The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945, resulted in the deaths of 120,000 to 250,000 Japanese by incineration and radiation poisoning. Although a small fraction of the victims were soldiers, the great majority were noncombatants -- women, children, the aged. Among the justifications that have been put forward for President Harry Truman’s decision to use the bomb, only one is worth taking seriously -- that it saved lives. The alternative, the reasoning goes, was to launch an invasion. Truman claimed in his memoirs that this would have cost another half a million American lives. Winston Churchill put the figure at a million. Revisionist historians have cast doubt on such numbers. Wartime documents suggest that military planners expected around 50,000 American combat deaths in an invasion. Still, when Japanese casualties, military and civilian, are taken into account, the overall invasion death toll on both sides would surely have ended up surpassing that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars will continue to argue over whether there were other, less catastrophic ways to force Tokyo to surrender. But given the fierce obstinacy of the Japanese militarists, Truman and his advisers had some grounds for believing that nothing short of a full-scale invasion or the annihilation of a big city with an apocalyptic new weapon would have succeeded. Suppose they were right. Would this prospect have justified the intentional mass killing of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In the debate over the question, participants on both sides have been playing the numbers game. Estimate the hypothetical number of lives saved by the bombings, then add up the actual lives lost. If the first number exceeds the second, then Truman did the right thing; if the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs. That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. **According to utilitarianism**, a form of moral reasoning that arose in the 19th century, **the goodness or evil of an action is determined solely by its consequences. If somehow you can save 10 lives by boiling a baby, go ahead and boil that baby.** There is, however, an older ethical tradition, one rooted in Judeo-Christian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Paul’s condemnation of those who say, “Let us do evil, that good may come.” Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are absolutely forbidden. **It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved thereby**. Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner). But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists made much of the “indivisibility” of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nation’s entire economic and social strength was deployed behind its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration. “There are no civilians in Japan,” declared an intelligence officer of the Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination. The boundary between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder? When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed, civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill. It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the rulers of Japan. The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people. **What Hiroshima and Nagasaki did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of utilitarian thinking in the conduct of war.** The conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an international commission in the 1920’s in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be used to end, in Churchill’s words, “the vast indefinite butchery.” It is a moral calculus that, for all its logical consistency, offends our deep-seated intuitions about the sanctity of life -- our conviction that a person is always to be treated as an end, never as a means. Left up to the warmakers, moreover, **utilitarian calculations are susceptible to bad-faith reasoning: tinker with the numbers enough and virtually any atrocity can be excused in the national interest**. In January, the world commemorated the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, where mass slaughter was committed as an end in itself -- the ultimate evil. The moral nature of Hiroshima is ambiguous by contrast. Yet in the postwar era, when governments do not hesitate to treat the massacre of civilians as just another strategic option, the bomb’s sinister legacy is plain: it has inured us to the idea of reducing innocents to instruments and morality to arithmetic.

**L) We can’t control the world—makes accidents and serial policy failure inevitable**

**Roe 11** (August 14, John, Professor at Penn State, “Review: David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism, Oxford University Press, 1981”, http://points-of-inflection.blogspot.com/2011/08/review-david-ehrenfeld-arrogance-of.html nkj)

I bought this book when I was a graduate student in Oxford. That must have been rather soon after it was published, though my memory is that the copy I still own was bought second-hand or remaindered. Perhaps this book’s uncompromising message meant that it was far from popular.

One possible conclusion should be cleared up at the start. At that time, many books and articles could be found which aimed to mobilize evangelical Christians against what was often described as “secular humanism”, thought of as a kind of established irreligion. Ehrenfeld’s title might make you think this is one of those books. It isn’t. In fact, many Christians (and other religious believers) might be surprised to find themselves among the “humanists” of the book’s title.

So what is the “humanism” that Ehrenfeld identifies? It is “our irrational faith in the limitless power of human reason – its ability to confront and solve the many problems that humans face, its ability to rearrange both the world of Nature and the affairs of men and women so that human life will prosper.” Ehrenfeld perceives this faith as a secularized version of the Greek and medieval doctrine of final causes – the idea that everything exists for some discernible end or purpose, primarily for the benefit of humanity. “Thus the idea of using a Nature created for us, the idea of control, and the idea of human superiority became associated early in our history… It only remained to diminish the idea of God, and we arrived at full-fledged humanism.” And later, “Humanism is at the heart of our present world culture; we share its unseen assumptions of control, and this bond makes mockery of more superficial differences (among us).”

The book aims to demolish these “assumptions of control” by example and argument. The examples range from literature and science fiction to specific recent events, some of which may now not be remembered. Who now recalls the fire in the cable spreading room at the Brown’s Ferry nuclear plant, which was caused by workers attempting to check for air leaks in flammable insulation material using a candle flame, and which revealed a common mode failure possibility that had not been captured in supposedly exhaustive fault tree analysis? After Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, probably few. But that is exactly the point. “The point is that human-designed systems of great power and complexity will always have accidents, as our emotional judgment rightly warns us, and no application of rational control systems, however carefully and skillfully engineered, can possibly prevent them from happening.”

It is not hard to collect examples of failures of control. Ehrenfeld goes on to argue that total control will always be a myth. Control can be achieved, for a limited time and in a limited arena, but only by expending significant resources outside the controlled arena: these expenditures endure that our solutions will in the end only be “quasi-solutions”, and they will yield their own crop of “residue problems” in due course. The scope over which control must be extended will therefore tend inexorably to widen; and at some point the cost of control may become more than the system can bear. The global trading networks on which so many of us rely for even the basic necessities of life provide a simple example. “In no important instance have we been able to demonstrate comprehensive, successful management of our world, nor do we understand it well enough to be able to manage it even in theory.”

Ehrenfeld identifies as humanistic the idea that all problems can be solved by human reason and ingenuity. To give an example (not Ehrenfeld’s): Many pages of discussion are devoted to the question: How will America supply its future energy needs? One camp points out the political risks, and depletion and pollution issues associated with fossil fuels; another, the intermittency and dubious economics of solar and wind power. But that little word “needs” papers over the fact that the universe is under no obligation to supply us with abundant, persistent, concentrated energy at all. As Enrenfeld says on a related matter, “This is a question which makes no sense outside of a humanist context, because it is predicated on the assumption that we can do as we please… What we want is often a separate thing form what actually happens, and I do not for a minute believe that the two will coincide in the future.”

**M)** **They dismiss proper risk assessment**

**Furedi 10** (Frank Furedi, professor of sociology at the University of Kent and author of several books, “Fear is key to irresponsibility”, 10/9/2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/fear-is-key-to-irresponsibility/story-e6frg6zo-1225935797740 -- note replaced as with is for grammar noted by brackets)

In the 21st century the optimistic belief in humanity's potential for subduing the unknown and to become master of its fate has given way to the belief that we are too powerless to deal with the perils confronting us. **We live in an era where problems associated with uncertainty and risk are amplified and, through our imagination, mutate swiftly into existential threats. Consequently, it is rare that unexpected natural events are treated as just that.** Rather, **they are swiftly dramatized and transformed into a threat to human survival**. The clearest expression of this tendency is the dramatization of weather forecasting. Once upon a time the television weather forecasts were those boring moments when you got up to get a snack. But with the invention of concepts such as ``extreme weather'', routine events such as storms, smog or unexpected snowfalls have acquired compelling entertainment qualities. This is a world where a relatively ordinary, technical, information-technology problem such as the so-called millennium bug was interpreted as a threat of apocalyptic proportions, and where a flu epidemic takes on the dramatic weight of the plot of a Hollywood disaster movie. Recently, when the World Health Organisation warned that the human species was threatened by the swine flu, it became evident that it was cultural prejudice rather than sober risk assessment that influenced much of present-day official thinking. In recent times European culture has become confused about the meaning of uncertainty and risk. Contemporary Western cultural attitudes towards uncertainty, chance and risk are far more pessimistic and confused than they were through most of the modern era. Only rarely is uncertainty perceived as an opportunity to take responsibility for our destiny. Invariably uncertainty is represented as a marker for danger and change is often regarded with dread. Frequently, worst-case thinking displaces any genuine risk-assessment process. Risk assessment is based on an attempt to calculate the probability of different outcomes. Worst-case thinking -- these days known as precautionary thinking -- is based on an act of imagination. It imagines the worst-case scenario and demands that we take action on that basis. For example, earlier this year the fear that particles in the ash cloud from the volcanic eruption in Iceland could cause airplane engines to shut down automatically swiftly mutated into the conclusion that they would. **It was the fantasy** of the worst case, rather than risk assessment, **that led to a panic**ky official ban on air traffic.

### 2NC Lanza Supplement

**No death impact**

**Lanza 11**

Robert Lanza, PHD, Wake Forest, 05/25/11, “What Is Death?”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-lanza/transcending-death_b_865233.html>, KENTUCKY

Fortunately, there is more. In Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," the great philosopher explained how space and time are forms of human intuition. Indeed, everything you see and experience is information in your mind. If space and time are tools of the mind, then we shouldn't be surprised that at death there's a break in the connection of time and place. Without consciousness, space and time are meaningless; in reality we can take any time -- or any spatial plane -- and estimate everything against this new frame of reference. Death is simply a break in our linear stream of consciousness. Indeed, biocentrism suggests it's a manifold to all dimensional potentialities (see "What Happens When You Die?). Time is the inner sense that animates existence, not just our thoughts and feelings, but the spatial representations we experience from birth until death. It's just the way we connect things, not an invisible, continuous matrix with people and particles bouncing around in it. Consciousness isn't created or destroyed -- it only changes forms. It's like a bubble machine that creates spheres -- spheres of space and time, which we carry around with us like turtles with shells. Physics tells us observations can't be predicted absolutely. Rather, there's a range of possible observations each with a different probability. According to one interpretation, each of these possible observations corresponds to a different universe (the "multiverse"). There are an infinite number of universes (including our own) that comprise everything that can possibly happen. Thus, death doesn't exist in any real sense, since all possible universes exist simultaneously regardless of what happens in any of them.